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AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ARBITRARY
ACCEPTANCE OF GUILTY PLEAS AS
STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST
Mary Cecilia Sweeney-Kwok*
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following situation: Vicki is arrested for securities
fraud involving an Internet intitial public offering. Vicki confesses to
facts already known by the investigators, and claims that that she is
only a pawn in her friend Liz's game. Vicki pleads guilty in exchange
for a lesser charge than if she had gone to court.' As part of the deal,
the prosecutor prepares Vicki's plea allocution,' which incriminates
"another" in the conspiracy to which Vicki has confessed.' In the trial
against Liz, the prosecution calls Vicki as a witness. Vicki exercises
her right not to testify, which renders her unavailable.4  The
prosecution then offers Vicki's plea allocution, under the Federal
Rules of Evidence 804(b)(3) hearsay exception for statements against
interest,5 as evidence of the conspiracy to which Vicki confessed.6
"J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Daniel Richman for his thoughtful guidance. Thanks to Professor James
Cohen and Professor Ian Weinstein for their comments. I am especially grateful to
my parents, Edward and Ann Sweeney, and husband, Alister Kwok, for providing
everlasting support and encouragement in all my endeavors.
1. See infra Part III.A.1.a.
2. See infra Part III.A.1.c.
3. Allocutions later accepted into evidence in a criminal trial generally do not
refer to others by name, but when they are offered as evidence against another
defendant, the logical conclusion is that the defendant is the person directly
incriminated. See infra notes 141-42, 163, 328-32 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 283.
5. The Federal Rules define a statement against interest as
[a] statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the
declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
6. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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The Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits would admit the
allocution 7 because the declarant would have been under oath, in the
presence of a judge, and facing a potentially lengthy prison sentence.8
These circuits ignore the effect of the plea bargaining process on the
reliability of an accomplice's plea allocution.9 Although the highest
courts of Minnesota and Mississippi have found such plea allocutions
to be so unreliable that their admission violates the Confrontation
Clause,"' no other circuit has addressed the admissibility of an
unavailable accomplice's plea allocution. Most, however, have found
statements of an accomplice-declarant made to the government to be
self-serving and therefore unreliable." This Note argues that the
admission of an accomplice's guilty plea, tainted by government
involvement, 2 violates the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by a
majority of the Supreme Court in Lilly v. Virginia,3 and by a majority
of the circuit courts. Additionally, this Note demonstrates that
admission of plea allocutions to prove an element of an offense
improperly circumvents the intent of Rule 803(22). 4
Part I of this Note discusses the history and purpose of the
statement against interest exception in the common law, statutory,
and Confrontation Clause contexts. Part II examines the conflict
between the approach of the circuits that admit guilty pleas of
unavailable declarants on a seemingly per se basis, and the contrary
view of other courts and commentators. Part III argues that the
arbitrary admission of guilty pleas, particularly of alleged accomplices,
violates the Confrontation Clause because of the incentives inherent
in the plea bargaining process. Part III also offers a statutory
argument as an alternative to the constitutional argument, finding that
the admission of plea allocutions improperly circumvents legislative
intent under, inter alia, the Second Circuit decision in United States v.
Oates.5
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. The actual sentence bargained for and received by the declarant often will be
much less than that potentially "risked" by allocuting, and certainly less than what the
declarant could have received after conviction at trial. See infra Part III.A.l.a; infra
note 155.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. See infra Part III.A.l.c.
13. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). There was no majority opinion in Lilly.
See infra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
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I. ADMISSIBILITY OF ACCOMPLICE CONFESSIONS AS STATEMENTS
AGAINST INTEREST: THE COMMON LAW, THE FEDERAL RULES,
AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The common law, Supreme Court, and other federal courts did not
recognize the statement against penal interest exception to the
hearsay rule until the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975.6 Although there had been wide support for the admissibility of
exculpatory statements against penal interest, statements made to
authorities that incriminated other persons had been generally
considered unreliable. 7 Section A discusses the common law hearsay
exception for statements against interest, which does not include
accomplice confessions offered by the prosecution.
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), governing the admission of
statements against penal interest, was enacted with the understanding
that statements made to authorities, inculpating another or others,
would not be admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 8 Section B
covers Rule 804(b)(3), its legislative history, and the Advisory
Committee Notes.
Finally, Section C discusses accomplice statements against penal
interest in the context of the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. As the lower courts continue to grapple with
prosecutorial use of the rule, the Supreme Court has consistently
emphasized its aversion to the admission of accomplice statements
made to authorities.
Although the Court has not addressed the admission of plea
allocutions under the exception for statements against interest, the
Court has never upheld the admission against a non-declarant of a co-
conspirator's statement to the government. 9 All nine Justices in Lilly
v. Virginia2" reiterated the Court's unwillingness to permit the
admission of such statements against an accused.2'
A. The Common Law Excludes Accomplice Statements Made to the
Government
When offered at another defendant's trial, a guilty plea allocution is
an out-of-court statement. When introduced to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, a plea allocution is hearsay. The hearsay rule bars
such a statement unless it qualifies under an exception to the rule.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
20. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
21. See infra Part I.C.3.
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Plea allocutions of unavailable declarants are generally offered under
the hearsay exception for statements against interest.22
Hearsay is an "assertion[], offered testimonially, which ha[s] not
been in some way subjected to the test of cross-examination. '23 The
theory behind the exclusion is that, without cross-examination, those
"deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error [or] untrustworthiness,
which [may] lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness,"
cannot be exposed. 4 While most cases require that testimony also
should be under oath, "it is clear beyond doubt that the oath.., is
merely an incidental feature customarily accompanying cross-
examination, and that cross-examination is the essential and real test
required by the rule. '25 The "statement made under oath is, merely as
such, equally obnoxious to the hearsay rule. 216 Not even an oath can
substitute for cross-examination.
An exception to the hearsay rule may exist, however, where "it may
be sufficiently clear.., that the statement offered is free enough from
the risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-
examination would be a work of supererogation. '27 Similarly, when
cross-examination is impossible due to the unavailability of the
declarant, "so far as... some substitute for cross-examination is found
to have been present, there is ground for making an exception. 28
According to Dean Wigmore, the trustworthiness of a statement
against interest is assumed because of the "experience that a
statement asserting a fact distinctly against one's interest is unlikely to
be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect. '29 Such a statement is
22. See infra Part II.
23. 5 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1362, at 3 (Chadbourn rev.
1974) (emphasis omitted).
24. Id. Wigmore considers the purpose of confrontation to be cross-examination.
For Wigmore, "the right of confrontation is identical with the right to cross-examine."
Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 557, 592 (1992).
Wigmore defines confrontation as "the opportunity of cross-examination." Wigmore,
supra note 23, § 1362, at 28. He continues:
Confrontation also involves a subordinate and incidental advantage, namely,
the observation by the tribunal of the witness' demeanor on the stand, as a
minor means of judging the value of his testimony. But this minor
advantage is not regarded as essential, i.e., it may be dispensed with when it
is not feasible. Cross-examination, however, the essential object of
confrontation, remains indispensable.
Id.
25. Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1365, at 10.
26. Id. See infra Part II.B for discussion on the oath as an indication of reliability.
27. Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1420, at 251.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 1457, at 329; see Mercer's Adm'r v. Mackin, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 434, 441
(1879); Gibblehouse v. Stong, 3 Rawle 437,438 (Pa. 1832). This rationale, however, is
troubling: "people do not normally intentionally say things that are against their
interest, it seems much more likely that a statement that appears to be against interest
is in fact not against interest." Ronald J. Allen, et. al., Evidence: Text, Cases, and
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"sufficiently sanctioned, though oath and cross-examination are
wanting."3  In other words, the need for the truth-finding tool of
cross-examination may be lessened when a declarant's statement is
truly against his or her interest.
Whether a statement of a fact is "against interest," however,
depends upon the circumstances.3 For this premise, Wigmore's
treatise cites to a case in which a statement was made to a police
officer directly after an arrest.3 2 The court found that the hearsay was
not admissible as a statement against interest, because "[i]t is common
knowledge that an arrestee can 'curry[] favor with law enforcement
authorities by implicating others in the offence."' 33  According to
Wigmore, a declarant who can make a deal by incriminating others
cannot be in circumstances that create a statement against interest.34
As the Supreme Court has noted, Wigmore "expressly
distinguishes" these kinds of statements, offered by the prosecution,
from exculpatory statements offered by an accused.35 Although the
treatise urges the admission of the latter, confessions by an alleged
accomplice "are not to be used by the prosecution against the
accused,"36 because "the interest of A. in obtaining a pardon by
confessing and betraying his cocriminals is in such cases usually so
important that, according to the doctrine of preponderance of interest,
the statement would not even under the present exception be
admissible." 37
Problems 575 (2d ed. 1997). Similarly, as the Supreme Court has noted, "[o]ne of the
most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems
particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature." United States v.
Williamson, 512 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1994).
30. Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1457, at 329.
31. Id. § 1463, at 337; see Duncan v. Smith, 393 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex. 1965).
32. United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see Wigmore, supra
note 23, § 1463, at 337.
33. Johnson, 802 F.2d at 1465 (quoting United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293,
1296 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (second alteration in original); see Wigmore, supra note 23, §
1463, at 337.
34. See Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1463, at 337; id. § 1477, at 358 n.1 (finding that
"the interest of A. in obtaining a pardon by confessing and betraying his cocriminals is
in such cases usually so important that.., the statement would not even under the
present exception be admissible").
35. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (citing Wigmore, supra note 23, §
1477, at 358 n.1).
36. Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1477, at 358 n.1. The treatise excepts such
confessions "so far as they are the admissions of a coconspirator." Id. This exception
appears in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(e).
37. Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1477, at 358 n.1 (citation omitted). The doctrine of
preponderance of interest "admit[s] the statement only if on the whole the disserving
interest preponderates in probable influence." Id. § 1464, at 338. Dean Wigmore
notes a minority view in which "the counter-interest should affect only the weight of
the evidence." Id.
20021
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B. The Drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence Intended to Exclude
an Accomplice's Custodial Statement to Authorities
Until very recently, the Supreme Court and the other federal courts
did not acknowledge an exception for statements against penal
interest.38 The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975
created this new exception. The Rules generally exclude hearsay,3 9
but Rule 804 allows the admission of certain kinds of hearsay where
the declarant is unavailable to testify in court.4' Rule 804(b)(3) is the
specific exception for statements against interest, including those
against penal interest.41
The Rule was not intended to include all statements against penal
interest. In fact, the preliminary draft of the Rule was the inverse of
38. Although exculpatory statements against penal interest are included under the
Rule, such statements are offered by the accused and pose no Confrontation Clause
concerns. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion). Despite the lack of a
constitutional conflict, the Supreme Court at first did not allow even the admission of
exculpatory hearsay under an exception for statements against interest because the
exception was not recognized under the common law. Donnelly v. United States, 228
U.S. 243 (1913) (exculpatory confession). The Court held, in accordance with
traditional English law, that only statements against pecuniary interest could be
admitted in the trial of someone other than the declarant. Id. at 272-77. This decision
was widely criticized, Lilly, 527 U.S. at 129-30 (plurality opinion) (discussing the
criticism of Donnelly by Wigmore and other commentators), and eventually the Court
"endorsed the more enlightened view" in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973), holding that a court may admit exculpatory statements against interest. Lilly,
527 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion).
The Supreme Court directly addressed the admissibility of inculpatory statements
against penal interest in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which overruled
Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957). The Bruton court premised the
opinion on the express understanding that statements against penal interest could not
be admitted against the accused, noting that "the hearsay statement inculpating
petitioner was clearly inadmissible against him under traditional rules of
evidence .... There is not before us, therefore, any recognized exception to the
hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned .... " Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n.3.
39. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). According to the Rules, "[h]earsay is not admissible
except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." Fed. R. Evid. 802.
40. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a). A declarant may be considered unavailable if the
declarant has exercised a privilege not to testify; refuses to testify despite a court
order; has no memory of the subject matter of the hearsay; is physically or mentally
unable to testify; or is absent despite the proponent's reasonable efforts to procure
declarant's attendance. Id.
The Advisory Committee to the Rules noted that unavailability is a prerequisite
because Rule 804(b) hearsay "is not equal in quality to testimony of the declarant on
the stand." Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) advisory committee's note. This view contrasts with
the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 803, which "suggests that unavailability is not
required for [Rule] 803 exceptions because they are reliable hearsay." Allen, supra
note 29, at 556.
41. See supra note 5.
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the Rule today.42 The first draft excluded statements implicating the
defendant, offered by the prosecution:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject him to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim
by him against another or to make him an object of hatred, ridicule,
or social disapproval, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. This
example does not include a statement or confession offered against the
accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person
implicating both himself and the accused.4 3
The drafters of the Rule believed the last line to be
"constitutionally required"" by the Supreme Court's decisions in
Douglas v. Alabama45 and Bruton v. United States.46 Both of these
decisions held that the admission of nontestifying accomplices'
custodial confessions violated the defendant's confrontation right.47
Legislative history shows that the preliminary rule remained
unchanged until Congress became involved.48  The last line was
changed, largely due to pressure from one senator,49 to the current
version because "[c]odification of a constitutional principal is
unnecessary. "' 0
42. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) [hereinafter Preliminary
Draft].
43. Rule 8-04(b)(4) from the Preliminary Draft, supra note 42 (emphasis added).
44. Peter W. Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development,
Application, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69
Geo. L.J. 851, 866 n.52 (1981). The preliminary draft of the exception also allowed
exculpatory statements offered by the accused, an influence of Wigmore. Id. at 867
n.55.
45. 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (finding the use of accomplice's custodial confession on
direct examination of nontestifying prosecution witness a violation of defendant's
confrontation right); see infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
46. 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (finding the admission of codefendant's custodial
confession against its declarant, despite the use of limiting instructions, to be an
"intolerabl[e]" violation of defendant's confrontation right in joint trial); see infra
notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
47. In Douglas, the admission, through the prosecution's direct examination of the
nontestifying declarant as a hostile witness, had been against the defendant. Douglas,
380 U.S. at 416-17. In Bruton, the confession had been admitted against the declarant
in defendant's joint trial, and the jury had been instructed to consider the confession
only against the declarant. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123-25.
48. Andrew R. Keller, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the
Confrontation Clause, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 159, 175 (1983).
49. Tague, supra note 44, at 873-97 (describing the substantial involvement of
Senator John L. McClellan, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws
and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, resulting in the current
version of 804(b)(3)).
50. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Report on the Federal Rules of Evidence, S.
Rep. No. 93-1277, at 22 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7068. The major
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The final version of the Rule, therefore, was not meant to reflect
constitutional principles. Its drafters assumed that courts would
exclude statements that the Supreme Court had found violative of the
Confrontation Clause under Bruton-for example, custodial
confessions of accomplices offered by the prosecution." The
Advisory Committee agreed that the last line was unnecessary5 2
because an accomplice confession made in custody could never qualify
as a statement against interest. 3
The final Rule formally recognizes a statement against penal
interest as an exception to the hearsay rule, evidencing the Advisory
Committee's finding that "exposure to criminal liability satisfies the
against-interest requirement."54  The Advisory Committee noted,
however, "[w]hether a statement is in fact against interest must be
determined from the circumstances of each case."55 Echoing the
preliminary draft's Bruton line, the Committee commented that "a
statement admitting guilt and implicating another person, made while
in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the
authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest."56 The very
same statement made "to an acquaintance[] would have no difficulty
in qualifying. 57
The intention of the final Rule was that an accomplice's custodial
statement, offered against the accused by the prosecution, could not
be admitted as a statement against interest. First, admission of the
statement would violate the defendant's confrontation right.5 8
impetus behind the change seems to have been Senator McClellan's concern that the
preliminary draft of the rule would, if enacted, "further debilitate an already weak
Federal system of criminal justice," by allowing a defendant to offer exculpatory
statements without collaboration. Tague, supra note 44, at 873 (quoting Letter from
Senator John L. McClellan to Judge Albert B. Maris, Committee on the Rules of
Practice and Procedure (Aug. 12, 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
requirement of collaboration for exculpatory statements was added after Senator
McClellan cosponsored a bill that could have "jeopardize[d]" the work accomplished
on the Rules to that point. Id. at 873-74.
51. Tague, supra note 44 at 895 n.207.
52. The preliminary draft of the rule "relied upon [Bruton] only to repel any
supposition that a statement of this kind is truly against interest." Id. at 892 n.191
(citing Preliminary Draft of Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, (Public's)
Suggestions with Reporter's Comments, at 191 (on file at Judicial Conference)); see
also Proposed Rule 8-04(4) advisory committee's note, Preliminary Draft, supra note
42, at 386 ("The unacceptability of a confession [incriminating the defendant] as a
declaration against interest is emphasized in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
White ... ").
53. Tague, supra note 44, at 892-93.
54. Fed. R. Evid. 804 advisory committee's note.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Justice White's dissent in Bruton).
57. Id.; cf. Denny v. Gudmanson, 252 F.3d 896, 903 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
confessions to friends and relatives are admissible under the Confrontation Clause
where self-inculpatory, non-custodial, and not blame-shifting).
58. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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Second, the statement, by definition, fails to qualify as "against
interest" because the accomplice's self-interest most likely provided
the impetus for the statement in the first place.59 These subtleties
escaped parties in the courts. Before long, the Supreme Court had to
interpret the new Rule in light of the old confrontation right.
C. The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court's Longstanding
Aversion to Accomplice Statements Made by Unavailable Declarants
The plea allocution of an unavailable declarant, offered for its truth
against the accused,60 not only must qualify under some hearsay
exception6 but must also satisfy the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.6" While the Supreme Court never has addressed the
admission of an accomplice's plea ,allocution as a statement against
interest,63 the Court has yet to uphold the admission of an
accomplice's custodial confession against a non-declarant defendant.'
59. See supra text accompanying note 53.
60. The prior guilty plea of a party to a case is an admission and so may be
admitted for its truth, without regard for the reliability of the statement, against the
declarant when offered by the opposing party. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). The basis for
common law and statutory exceptions for party-opponent admissions is not any
theory of reliability, but rather "the adversarial nature of the process." Paul R. Rice &
Neals-Erik William Delker, A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D.
678, 690 (2000).
61. Note that judgments against third persons, offered to prove an element of an
offense against an accused, are excluded from the exception in Rule 803(22). See infra
Part III.B.
62. The Constitution guarantees
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of Counsel for his defen[se].
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
63. In Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), the Court found unconstitutional
a statute that allowed a guilty plea entered by a thief of property to be admitted
against the recipient of the property as conclusive evidence of the property's stolen
nature. This decision was the basis for the exclusion in Rule 803(22). See infra Part
III.B.
64. A plurality of the Court affirmed the admission of a spontaneous comment to
a cellmate informant. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (upholding the admission of
a coconspirator's statement made while in the "concealment" phase of a conspiracy,
as excepted under Georgia's rules of evidence). The Lilly plurality noted, however,
that
[w]hile Justice Stewart's plurality opinion observed that the declarant's
statement was "against his penal interest," the Court's judgment did not rest
on that point, and in no way purported to hold that statements with such an
attribute were presumptively admissible. Rather, the five Justices in the
majority emphasized the unique aspects of the case and emphasized that the
co-conspirator spontaneously made the statement and "had no apparent
reason to lie."
2002]
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This section first discusses the underpinnings of the Court's pre-
Federal Rules Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, forged by the
Court's protection of the accused from the admission of accomplice
custodial statements.65 This section then examines the Court's post-
Federal Rules decisions and its continuing aversion, despite a
compromise in the confrontation right, to the admission of
unavailable accomplice incriminations against the defendant.66 The
Court's statutory interpretation of Federal Rule 804(b)(3) is examined
for the meaning of the term "statement against interest" and the
resulting criteria for the admission of accomplice statements under
that exception. 67 Finally, this section discusses the Supreme Court's
unabated distrust of accomplice statements made to the government,
exemplified by Lilly v. Virginia.68
1. Pre-Federal Rules Forging of a Pure Confrontation Right and the
Inadmissibility of Unavailable Accomplice Custodial Confessions
Against the Accused
The Court first addressed prosecutorial use of a custodial
confession in Douglas v. Alabama.69 The codefendant implicated the
petitioner in a confession, was tried separately and convicted, and
exercised his privilege not to testify at the petitioner's trial. The
prosecution was permitted to treat the declarant as a hostile witness
and, as part of the examination, to read statements from the
purported confession.70  The Supreme Court found that the
prosecution's reading from the confession effectively introduced the
confession into evidence,7 and held that the defendant was denied his
right to confrontation because he was unable to question the declarant
about the truth of the alleged confession.72
The Court also emphasized the importance of confrontation in
Pointer v. Texas,73 which it decided on the same day as Douglas, and in
Barber v. Page.74 In these cases, the Court found that the right to
confrontation extended to testimony from the defendant's preliminary
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 132 n.2 (1999) (citations omitted).
65. See infra Part I.C.1.
66. See infra Part I.C.2.
67. See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
68. See infra Part I.C.3.
69. 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (holding that the Confrontation Clause is applicable to the
states).
70. Id. at 416-17.
71. Id. at 419.
72. Id. at 419-20. Because the confession was "a fundamental part" of the case
against the defendant, the error was not harmless and required reversal. Id. at 420.
73. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that the right to confrontation extends to
testimony from the defendant's preliminary hearing).
74. 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (finding that cross-examined prior testimony may not be
admitted despite a showing of unavailabillity).
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hearing75 and that because confrontation is a "trial right," even the
admission of cross-examined prior testimony may be found unjustified
despite declarant's unavailability.76 For the confrontation right to be
satisfied, the Court required, at the very least, that prior testimony be
subject to cross-examination by counsel for the accused.77 The Court
therefore required that statements against penal interest, even as prior
testimony, were admissible only if the accused had been given the
opportunity to confront the declarant."
In Bruton v. United States, the Court held that the confession of a
nontestifying codefendant in a joint jury trial is inadmissible as an
admission against the declarant when it implicates the accused, despite
the use of limiting instructions to that effect.79 The lower court had
instructed the jury not to consider the confession against the
petitioner, but only against the declarant.80 The Supreme Court
reversed the petitioner's conviction, holding that limiting instructions
cannot protect a defendant's confrontation right sufficiently in a joint
trial when hearsay as damaging as the confession of a nontestifying
codefendant is admitted."1
The Bruton Court found accomplice incriminations to be
"inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the
stand and the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully
given the recognized motivation to shift blame onto others."8  It
referred to the decision in Pointer, finding the inherent unreliability of
this kind of evidence "intolerabl[e]" when the accused is denied the
right to confront the declarant.83
75. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407.
76. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725.
77. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407 (finding that the admission of testimony from a
preliminary hearing at which defendant had no counsel denied him the right to cross-
examine the declarant); see Barber, 390 U.S. at 725 (finding that defendant has not
waived the right to cross-examine declarant of prior testimony where government has
made no showing of declarant's unavailability).
78. Mark E. Sharp, Military Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3)'s Statement Against Penal
Interest Exception: Can the Rule Stand on Its Own?, 130 Mil. L. Rev. 77, 86 (1990).
79. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (overruling Delli Paoli v. United
States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957)).
80. Id. at 125.
81. Id. at 126. The Court found that the confession "added substantial ... weight
to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination." Id. at 128.
82. Id. at 136.
83. Id. The Court qualified the Bruton holding in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S.
200 (1987). In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held that a
nontestifying codefendant's inculpatory statement which is "not incriminating on its
face," but becomes "so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial," is
admissible against the declarant in a joint trial when accompanied by a proper limiting
instruction and redacted of all reference to the accused. Id. at 208. For a discussion
on the viability of redaction, see Benjamin E. Rosenberg, The Future of Codefendant
Confessions, 30 Seton Hall L. Rev. 516, 530-36 (2000). Professor Douglass "would
exclude the accomplice confession [from joint trials] not because it is unreliable ...
[but] simply because the government, by its affirmative choice to indict and try the
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2. Post-Federal Rules Confrontation Clause Analysis
Ohio v. Roberts was the first post-Federal Rules case that
significantly impacted Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.84  In
Roberts, the Court made an express link between the Confrontation
Clause and the reliability of hearsay.85 The Court held that the
statement of an unavailable declarant may be admissible under the
Confrontation Clause if it "bears adequate 'indicia of reliability"':
"Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."86
The Court subsequently refined the latter part of the Roberts test in
Idaho v. Wright," requiring that hearsay evidence "possess indicia of
defendants together, has made it impossible to confront the reluctant accomplice."
John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1797,
1814 n.57 (2001) (arguing that the Confrontation Clause, while mandating
confrontation, does not simultaneously mandate exclusion of hearsay).
In Richardson, the petitioner's own testimony permitted the inference that she was
present during the planning of the crime. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208. But see
Sanders v. Moore, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1319 n.28 (M.D. Fla. 2001). The court in
Sanders noted that
even in joint trials, the admission into evidence of a redacted statement
made by an accomplice has been held violative of the objecting defendant's
right of confrontation where the redacted statement, despite the lack of any
explicit reference to the objecting defendant, could reasonably be
understood only as referring to that defendant.
Id. (citing, inter alia, United States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572 (11th Cir. 1995)).
84. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (finding the Confrontation Clause
satisfied where the prosecution had made a good-faith attempt to locate an
unavailable declarant and where defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine
declarant at the preliminary hearing from which the prosecution wanted to offer
testimony).
85. See John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual
Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 191,
203-06 (1999) (finding that Roberts simply continued what had been started in Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), which was decided on procedural grounds but
also interpreted the Confrontation Clause as an evidentiary rule that would give way
to exceptions).
86. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. This test suggests that the Confrontation Clause
requires a showing of unavailability for all hearsay offered by the prosecution. White
v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); Rosenberg, supra note
83, at 537. The Court's concern in cases involving accomplice incriminations is
emphasized by its dismissal of the unavailability requirement in other cases. See
White, 502 U.S. at 353-57 (holding that unavailability was not a requirement under the
Confrontation Clause for excited utterances and statements made for medical
treatment); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (holding that a
coconspirator's statement made in the furtherance of a conspiracy was admissible
without a showing of the declarant's unavailability). No court has found Rule
804(b)(3) to be a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., United States
v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the court has declined to
decide whether 804(b)(3) is a firmly-rooted exception).
87. 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (involving the incriminating hearsay of unavailable victim
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reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to
other evidence at trial."88 The Wright Court rejected the argument
that "evidence corroborating the truth of a hearsay statement may
properly support a finding that the statement bears 'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.' '89 The Court concluded that the
hearsay rule would not bar the admission of a statement "if the
declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances
that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility."9
Despite a definite compromise in what many had considered to be
an absolute confrontation right,91 the Court has not upheld the
admission of an accomplice statement, made to authorities, that would
satisfy even the Roberts test.92 It identified the difficulty inherent in
admitting such statements by flagging them as "presumptively
unreliable" in Lee v. Illinois.93
The Lee Court found an accomplice's custodial confession
incriminating a defendant "presumptively unreliable,"94  and,
therefore, unable to qualify under a firmly rooted hearsay exception.9"
The Court concluded that the State failed to rebut the presumption of
inherent unreliability for accomplice confessions because the
statement was unsworn, given in response to interrogation by the
police, and untested by "contemporaneous cross-examination by
counsel."96
as related by pediatrician).
88. Id. at 822.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 820.
91. Criticism of the Roberts test, finding the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause inappropriate and duplicative of the hearsay inquiry, abounds.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure 94 (1997)
(arguing that only those statements of an unavailable declarant made expressly for
prosecutorial purposes are subject to complete exclusion); Berger, supra note 24
(arguing that the Confrontation Clause was intended as a prosecutorial restraint and
requires exclusion of an unavailable declarant's statement or documented procedures
for its admission); Douglass, supra note 83, at 1803 n.22, 1810 ("The Court's approach
invites both prosecutors and defendants to ignore confrontation in their pretrial
decisions because they both know that the ultimate admissibility of hearsay will
depend upon something else: its supposed reliability."); Richard D. Friedman,
Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. L.J. 1011 (1998) (arguing that
the confrontation right requires exclusion of statements, made by an unavailable
declarant, that may reasonably be considered to have been made for prosecutorial
purposes).
92. See supra note 64.
93. 476 U.S. 530, 539 (1986).
94. Id. (holding that an accomplice's confession is presumptively unreliable, and
that the particular confession at issue "did not bear sufficient independent 'indicia of
reliability"' to rebut the presumption).
95. Id. at 536. Petitioner and her codefendant had opted for a joint trial by a
judge without a jury. Id. Confessions of both defendants were admitted against each
declarant, and neither testified. Id. The trial judge expressly relied on the
codefendant's confession in deciding the guilt of the petitioner. Id. at 538.
96. Id. at 544.
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Additionally, the State failed to show that the confession was "free
from any desire, motive, or impulse [the codefendant] may have had
either to mitigate the appearance of his own culpability by spreading
the blame or to overstate Lee's involvement in retaliation for her
having implicated him in the murders."97 The codefendant "not only
had a theoretical motive to distort the facts to Lee's detriment, but...
he also was actively considering the possibility of becoming her
adversary: prior to trial, [he] contemplated becoming a witness for the
State against Lee."98
In Williamson v. United States,9 9 the Supreme Court interpreted
Federal Rule 804(b)(3) without reaching Confrontation Clause
analysis, 10 but narrowly construed the Rule because of the same
concerns about reliability.'0' Finding that "[o]ne of the most effective
ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth," the Court ruled that the
exception does not allow for the admission of non-self-inculpatory
statements, even though they may be part of a "broader narrative that
is generally self-inculpatory."' 12 For admission, the Court required
separate determinations that each statement offered under the
exception was self-inculpatory. 03
The Court also precluded admission of statements that directly
implicate the defendant. To implicate a defendant in a crime, the
inference to the crime must be made with other evidence. The Court
noted: "[W/]hen seen with other evidence, an accomplice's self-
inculpatory statement can inculpate the defendant directly: 'I was
robbing the bank on Friday morning,' coupled with someone's
testimony that the declarant and the defendant drove off together Friday
morning, is evidence that the defendant also participated in the
robbery."14
The Williamson Court emphasized that the self-inculpatory nature
of a statement depends on the circumstances. The Court offered the
following statement as an example: "Sam and I went to Joe's
97. Id.
98. Id. The Court noted that such incentives are a "reality of the criminal process,
namely, that once partners in a crime recognize that the 'jig is up,' they tend to lose
any identity of interest and immediately become antagonists, rather than
accomplices." Id. at 544-45.
99. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
100. Id. at 605.
101. Id. at 599-600.
102. Id. at 599-601.
103. As Justice Kennedy concluded, this approach narrows what would have been
acceptable under the common law exception. Id. at 618-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment). The common law, of course, would have excluded inculpatory
statements against penal interest, made by an accomplice to authorities, altogether.
See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy seems to have ignored
this fact in arguing that the common law allowed the inclusion of collateral statements
neutral to the declarant's interest. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 618-19 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
104. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added).
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house."'' 5 This statement "might be against the declarant's interest if
a reasonable person in the declarant's shoes would realize that being
linked to Joe and Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam's
conspiracy.' ' 1°6 The Court vacated the defendant's conviction, finding
that the declarant's statements, in light of the circumstances, may not
have been truly self-inculpatory. 7 A reasonable person in the
declarant's position might have thought that implicating another
would decrease his or her sentence. 8
The Williamson Court indicated in dicta that the "squarely" self-
inculpatory statement of an unavailable declarant might be admissible
against an accused under Rule 804(b)(3) as evidence of a
conspiracy.09 The Court did not hold that such a statement would
conclusively satisfy the Confrontation Clause."' The Court noted,
however, that "the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-
inculpatory-which our reading of Rule 804(b)(3) requires-is itself
one of the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a
statement admissible under the Confrontation Clause."''
105. Id.
106. Id. The Court rejected the approach advocated by Justice Kennedy, one that
would not bar the use of "collateral-neutral" statements. These are statements within
a broader self-inculpatory narrative that, while not necessarily self-serving, do not
solely implicate the declarant: "[W]hen two or more people are capable of committing
a crime and the declarant simply names the involved parties, that statement often is
considered neutral, not self-serving." Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment). In Justice Kennedy's example-"John and I robbed the bank"-the
phrase "John and" would be considered collateral-neutral. Id. at 612 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy notes that the entire statement is
neutral, "save for the possibility of conspiracy charges." Id. "The Court... adopt[s]
the extreme position that no collateral statements are admissible under Rule
804(b)(3)." Id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Under Williamson,
"a statement which shifts a greater share of the blame to another person (self-serving)
or which simply adds the name of a partner in crime (neutral) should be excluded."
Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 5 Weinstein's Federal Evidence 804-58
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002).
107. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 604.
108. Justice O'Connor noted: "Small fish in a big conspiracy often get shorter
sentences than people who are running the whole show, especially if the small fish are
willing to help the authorities catch the big ones." Id. (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 603. "[A] declarant's squarely self-inculpatory confession-'yes, I killed
X'-will likely be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) against accomplices of his who are
being tried under a co-conspirator liability theory." Id. (citing Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) (holding that evidence of acts committed by
coconspirators in the furtherance of a conspiracy, without direct evidence that an
accused participated in such acts, is sufficient to sustain a conviction against the
accused for the commission of such acts)).
110. Id. at 605.
111. Id. "[T]he Court suggested that if the accomplice statement legitimately falls
within the hearsay exception, it will satisfy the Sixth Amendment as well." Douglass,
supra note 83, at 1820.
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3. Lilly v. Virginia and the Supreme Court's Unabated Distrust of
Accomplice Incriminations Made to the Government
Lilly v. Virginia reversed the admission of another custodial
accomplice confession." 2 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsberg and Breyer, applied the Roberts reliability analysis." 3 The
plurality noted the Court's continued distrust of "an accomplice's
statements that shift or spread the blame to a criminal defendant.""' 4
Accordingly, the plurality reiterated that the blame-shifting statement
of an unavailable accomplice is presumptively unreliable." 5 The Lilly
plurality found it "highly unlikely" that this presumptive unreliability
could be rebutted "when the government is involved in the
statements' production, and when the statements describe past events
and have not been subjected to adversarial testing." '16
The plurality further narrowed the list of safeguards that would
allow for the admissibility of a statement under Roberts."7 The
plurality found that "the absence of an express promise of leniency"
does not ensure reliability because "police need not tell a person who
is in custody that his statements may gain him leniency in order for the
suspect to surmise that speaking up, and particularly placing blame on
his cohorts," could be in his best interest."8 The Lilly plurality
emphasized the necessity for adversarial testing, particularly where
the statement was made in response to leading questions." 9 The
Court reversed and remanded for harmless error analysis. 2"
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
characterized the admission of the custodial confession as "a
paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation."' 2 ' He cited to Justice
Thomas' concurring opinion in White v. Illinois,' in which Justice
Thomas found that the admission, without confrontation, of any
"formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions" violated the Confrontation Clause. 23
Justice Thomas agreed, in a separate concurrence, that a
Confrontation Clause violation had occurred, per his White
112. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999) (plurality opinion).
113. Justices Scalia and Thomas rejected the reliability analysis, but concurred in
part and in the judgment. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
114. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 137.
117. Prosecutors aim to characterize hearsay as statements against interest
"[t]hough the target may be a little smaller after Lilly." Douglass, supra note 83, at
1851.
118. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 139.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 140.
121. Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
122. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
123. Id. at 364-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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concurrence, but he also agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist in
emphasizing that not all statements incriminating a defendant should
be barred.1 24
While Lilly produced no majority opinion, "it is clear that a
custodial statement to law enforcement personnel does not fall within
a firmly rooted exception.' 1 25  Therefore, any custodial statement
made to authorities can only be admitted upon a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The Supreme Court
considers these statements to be presumptively unreliable because the
declarant's version of events likely will be influenced by his or her
interest in obtaining a lenient sentence.1 26 Because the Court has not
yet addressed the admissibility of an accomplice's plea allocution,
lower courts have applied the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
precedent to such statements with varying results. The next part
discusses these courts' analyses.
II. WHETHER ACCOMPLICE PLEA ALLOCUTIONS OFFER
"PARTICULARIZED GUARANTEES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS"
A person typically would not admit to a crime under penalty of
imprisonment without the admission being true.'27 In this respect, a
guilty plea is similar to custodial confessions. Plea allocutions,
however, are made under oath and in the presence of a judge, who
must ensure that the plea is voluntary and has a factual basis . 2s The
defendant may bargain with the prosecutor for a more lenient
sentence in exchange for the plea,'129 and the prosecution may prepare
the allocution, with the actual testimony of the declarant consisting
entirely of short answers in response to questioning. 30 Generally,
there is no adversarial testing by means of other evidence or witness
testimony. 3'
Although guilty pleas were not admitted by any circuit until several
years after the adoption of the Federal Rules,32 the admitting courts
have accepted the guilty plea of an unavailable accomplice as a
124. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143-44 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice Thomas, for example, would admit statements made to a family
member or bystander, or any other non-formal, nontestimonial statements, without
requiring confrontation. This position is similar to that of Akhil Reed Amar. See
Amar, supra note 91 (arguing that only those statements prepared for prosecutorial
purposes should be barred under the Confrontation Clause).
125. Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 7075 (3rd ed. 2000).
126. See supra notes 82-83, 94-98, 114-16 and accompanying text.
127. See supra Part I.A.
128. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. But see Abraham S. Goldstein, The Passive Judiciary:
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Guilty Plea 41 (1981) (finding that the majority of
accepted pleas have little resemblance to the truth); infra Part III.A.2.a.
129. See infra Part III.A.1.
130. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
131. See infra text accompanying note 318.
132. See United States v. Winley, 638 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1981).
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statement against interest and have found plea allocutions sufficiently
trustworthy under the Confrontation Clause.133 Courts allowing the
admission of allocutions generally consider guilty pleas to be
statements against interest per se because the declarant subjects
himself or herself to a potentially long sentence, though the actual
sentence received may be significantly reduced.'34 These courts also
find that the plea proceeding generally ensures the "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" required by Roberts for statements not
falling into a firmly-established exclusion to the hearsay rule.'35 Plea
allocutions have been found particularly trustworthy because the
declarant was under oath and in front of a judge. Section A of this
part discusses the analysis of the circuits that have not extended the
custodial confession analogy to the accomplice's plea allocution.
Section B discusses the analyses of state courts, including the
Supreme Courts of Minnesota and Mississippi, finding an accomplice's
allocution -though the declarant was under oath, in front of a judge,
and risking a potentially long imprisonment-to lack guarantees of
reliability sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
The analyses of the circuits that have not yet addressed the issue, as
applied to other statements against penal interest made to the
government, illuminate how these circuits would likely consider the
admissibility of an accomplice's allocution. Section C of this part
examines the decisions of these circuits on other statements against
penal interest, made to the government either in the custodial setting,
or under oath and in a formal, testimonial environment.
A. The Admitting Circuits
For admission in a criminal trial, the statement of an unavailable
declarant must qualify under a hearsay exception and satisfy analysis
under the Confrontation Clause.'36 The Second Circuit was the first
circuit to admit such statements, followed by the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits. These courts have held that plea allocutions qualify as
genuine statements against interest, and therefore are admissible
under Federal Rule 804(b)(3), and have inherent and particularized
133. The Second Circuit has the most decisions on the issue, all finding the
admission of guilty pleas to be constitutional. The Seventh Circuit agrees with the
reasoning of the Second Circuit. United States v. Centracchio, 265 F.3d 518, 529 (7th
Cir. 2001) ("Like the Second Circuit .... we find that [the declarant's] plea allocution
contains the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that justify its admissibility
under the Confrontation Clause."). The Ninth Circuit followed the analyses of the
Second and Seventh Circuits. United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir.
2002) ("We adopt the reasoning of the Second and Seventh Circuits and hold that
the ... guilty pleas at issue before us bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
sufficient [for] admission under the Confrontation Clause.").
134. See infra notes 137-40, 155 and accompanying text.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
136. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient for admission under the Sixth
Amendment.
1. The Second Circuit Approach
In the Second Circuit, a guilty plea generally is a statement against
interest, except when the declarant faces no criminal liability for the
crime to which he or she allocutes. 137 In other words, as a general rule,
a plea allocution qualifies under Rule 804(b)(3) as long as its
declarant faces some potential penalty.138  The Second Circuit
considers in its analysis only the potential penalty faced by the
declarant, even where the declarant, by pleading, has avoided
imprisonment entirely. 139 The court recently held: "[T]he guarantee of
trustworthiness.., is based on [the possibility of a lengthy sentence]
at the time the statement is made, even if the defendant expects to,
and in fact actually does, receive a lesser sentence.""14
The Second Circuit also finds it significant that a statement has
been redacted. Redaction usually means replacing the defendant's
name with a neutral word.14 1  The statement is considered self-
inculpatory if portions exculpating the declarant have been removed,
though the remaining portions may incriminate the defendant in
addition to the declarant.'42
137. United States v. Scopo, 861 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1988).
138. See id.
139. Id. at 348-49 (finding that, although the declarant did not serve any prison
time, his statements were against interest because he was exposed to a "potential"
prison term of forty years and fines of $275,000, and that "even if [declarant] privately
believed that because of his illness the court would not require him to suffer
incarceration, there would be little reason for him to suppose that the court would
also therefore excuse him from paying a fine").
140. United States v. Walsh, 7 Fed. Appx. 20, 2001 WL 290347, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar.
23, 2001) (considering only the declarant's potential sentence of twenty years though
he bargained for and received a sentence of only one and a half to two years).
141. The following is a typical plea allocution:
I entered into a conspiracy with others between March of 1997 and April of
1998 to commit securities and wire fraud in connection with four accounts at
Briarwood Investments by causing unauthorized transactions to be executed
in these four accounts of Briarwood Investments and knowing that such
transactions would be executed by telephone, fax, into an internal securities
clearing house system.
United States v. Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653, 655 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting the transcript of
a plea allocution, a portion of which was found to be erroneously admitted).
142. Walsh, 2001 WL 290347, at *2. This practice is at odds with Williamson, which
held that not even collateral-neutral statements may be admitted under Rule
804(b)(3). See Richard T. Sahuc, The Exception That Swallowed the Rule: The
Disparate Treatment of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as Interpreted in United
States v. Williamson, 55 U. Miami L. Rev. 867, 889 (2001) (finding the Second Circuit
to be one of the "main culprits in the misinterpretation of Williamson"); supra notes
99-108 and accompanying text.
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A recent decision sums up the Second Circuit's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence on the admission of a guilty plea when the
declarant is unavailable:
Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness exist where (1) the plea
allocution subjected the defendant to the risk of a lengthy term of
imprisonment, (2) the allocution was given under oath, and (3) the
district court instructs the jurors that the allocution may only be
considered as evidence that a conspiracy existed, and not as
evidence that the defendant in the instant case was a member of the
alleged conspiracy or otherwise guilty of the crimes charged against
[the declarant].'43
In a summary order, the Second Circuit observed that, as a general
rule, the existence of these three circumstances satisfy the
Confrontation Clause.'" The court in United States v. Petrillo'45 noted
that the third of these circumstances, the limiting jury instruction, is
"unrelated to the trustworthiness of the statement" at the time it was
made. 46
The Second Circuit also has recognized the explicit influence of the
prosecution as improper. In United States v. Tropeano, the
government asked the district court judge to inquire whether the
143. United States v. Chan, 184 F. Supp. 2d 337, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing
United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d. 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2000)). The Second Circuit
often finds inherent reliability in these circumstances. United States v. Gallego, 191
F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that "self-inculpatory portions of the
allocution... are particularly trustworthy"); United States v. Williams, 927 F.2d 95,
98-99 (2d Cir. 1991) (trusting the district court's judgment on trustworthiness of
declarants because district court conducted the allocutions); see also Chan, 184 F.
Supp. 2d at 343 n.2 (finding that because declarants were not cooperators, they had no
incentive to curry favor with the government at the plea hearings).
144. See, e.g., Moskowitz, 215 F.3d at 269 ("The instant case having the same
'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' found sufficient in [Gallego, 191 F.3d at
167] there was no Confrontation Clause violation in the admission of the plea
allocution.").
145. 237 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2000).
146. Id. at 123 n.1. A typical limiting instruction is as follows:[Y]ou may consider [the declarant's allocution] only on the following two
issues: (1) whether there was a conspiracy or scheme to commit securities
fraud, to make false statements and submit false documents to the [SEC], to
lie to the auditors, and to create false entries in... books and records; and(2) what if anything [declarant] did in order to further the objects of that
conspiracy if you find that it existed.
However, the question of whether the defendant on trial.., was also a
member of that conspiracy or the scheme alleged in the indictment is an
issue for which you will have to rely on other evidence. There is no evidence
in these statements naming any other defendant or co-conspirator.
If you find, based in part on these statements, that a conspiracy or a scheme
as charged in the indictment existed, you must decide as a separate question
whether the defendant on trial ... was a part of the alleged conspiracy or
scheme, based entirely on the other evidence in the case. There is nothing in
these statements that answers that question one way or another.
Moskowitz, 215 F.3d at 269 (third alteration in original).
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declarant had conspired with one person or more than one. 47 The
declarant answered that he had conspired with more than one
person. 48 This follow-up statement to the plea allocution, in answer
to an explicit government request, even though it did not attempt to
shift blame, "may well have been an attempt to 'curry favor,"' and as
such was found to lack necessary guarantees of trustworthiness. 49
Implicit influence on the accomplice's guilty plea allocution,
however, is not recognized by the Second Circuit as a legitimate factor
in the making of a plea allocution. The court in Petrillo found that the
"potential for coercion or misrepresentation during the negotiation
over guilty plea allocutions may be present in theory."'5 ° The court
concluded, however, that the district court did not abuse its discretion
where the statements "'were made in open court, under oath, before
the sentencing judge, following extensive pre-trial proceedings, with
the assistance of counsel, and against the declarants' penal
interests.""5'
2. The Seventh Circuit Approach
The Seventh Circuit first considered the admission of a plea
allocution in United States v. Seavoy. 52 The court in Seavoy
acknowledged that there was no cross-examination of the declarant's
testimony. Testimony was "fed... to him without objection from
defense counsel."'53  The court found sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness existed because the declarant was under oath and was
questioned by both the prosecutor and defense counsel about his
involvement in the crime. 54
Although there was evidence that the declarant had motivation to
lie in his statement in order to gain a substantial reduction in his
sentence,'55 the court found it significant that the statement presented
147. United States v. Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653, 655-56 (2d Cir. 2001).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 658-59. But see United States v. Centracchio, 265 F.3d 518 (2001)
(finding district court's exclusion of plea allocution an abuse of discretion despite
government preparation of allocution text); infra notes 161, 171 and accompanying
text.
150. United States v. Petrillo, 237 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2000).
151. Id. at 122-23 (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 60 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
152. 995 F.2d 1414 (7th Cir. 1993). The testimony had been offered pursuant to
Rule 804(b)(5)-subsequently renumbered as Rule 807-which provides a residual
exception for statements not specifically covered by another exception but possessing
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 807.
153. Seavoy, 995 F.2d at 1418.
154. Id.
155. Id. The declarant understood that his maximum statutory penalty would be
twenty-five years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine, but he had negotiated to receive
"between 51 and 78 months," that is, roughly, between four and eight years. Id. at
1421.
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a "neutral kind of story," corroborated by other evidence, and
implicating the defendant no more than the other evidence. 56 The
declarant's attempt to recant his guilty plea was not an indication of
the statement's untrustworthiness because of the "guarantees of
trustworthiness surrounding [the] plea."' 57 The court found the plea
hearing testimony to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.'58
In United States v. Centracchio,5 9 the Seventh Circuit found an
abuse of discretion in the district court's exclusion of a plea allocution
based on the credibility of the declarant, a known liar. 6" The
government had prepared the statement in question 6' and the
declarant was expecting a "good deal" when he adopted the statement
for his plea allocution.'62
In considering whether the statement qualified for admission under
Rule 804(b)(3), the Seventh Circuit found that the allocution was
"truly inculpatory to [declarant] only because [it] did not seek to
lessen blame as to his crime by spreading blame to others."'63 In other
words, the Seventh Circuit has held that a statement may be against
interest even though it incriminates others."6
Additionally, the court in Centracchio found that the circumstances
of the particular plea allocution supported the conclusion that "a plea
of guilty is likely to be a classic statement against penal interest."'65
The circumstances cited were that the statement was against interest
156. Id. at 1418-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). This bootstrapping is
directly at odds with Wright, decided three years previously. See supra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text.
157. Seavoy, 995 F.2d at 1419.
158. Id. The Court based its conclusion on its analysis for reliability under the
residual hearsay exception. Id.
159. 265 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2001).
160. Id. at 523. At the declarant's sentencing hearing, subsequent to the plea
hearing, the government argued that he had lied to a probation officer. Id.
161. The plea agreement was "entirely prepared by the government" and a portion
read by the prosecutor at declarant's plea colloquy. The declarant's actual testimony
consisted of two short, positive responses to required questioning by the presiding
judge. Id.
162. Id. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ironically, the court countered
defendant's argument that the declarant expected a "good deal" at the time of the
statement with the finding that, generally, a pleading declarant gets "a better deal"
than that which would have been expected from going to trial. Id. This finding
supports the argument that the guilty plea, under the circumstances, is not necessarily
a statement against interest. See infra Part III.A.l.a.
163. Centracchio, 265 F.3d at 525-26. The allocution inculpated other persons,
though not by name. The allocution stated that "at the beginning of each month...
Individual A made $500 bribe payments to defendant on behalf of the Outfit and at
the direction of Individual A's boss in the Outfit." Id. at 523 (quoting a portion of the
plea agreement adopted by declarant as his plea allocution).
164. This holding is at odds with Williamson, which held that not even collateral-
neutral statements may be admitted under Rule 804(b)(3). See supra notes 99-108 and
accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit's holding reflects the practice in the Second
Circuit. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
165. Centracchio, 265 F.3d at 526.
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and was made "with benefit of counsel, under oath, in front of a
federal judge, with no promise of leniency in the actual plea
agreement, and risking a substantial prison term."'66 While finding
"that when an accused person pleads guilty he is getting.., a better
deal than risking the consequences of going to trial," the court found
the allocution to be genuinely against the declarant's interest. 167
The court then considered whether the statement had inherent and
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient for admission
under the Sixth Amendment. 6s The court found the Second Circuit's
analysis persuasive. 69 Also, while the declarant may have pleaded to
get a "good deal," there was no evidence to show that he lied about
his guilt in the crime. 7 ' Similarly, "while the government was
admittedly involved in the production of the text of the plea
allocution," there was no evidence of manipulation of the text for the
purposes of prosecuting others.'71 The court held that the
circumstances of the plea proceeding provided the inherent
guarantees of trustworthiness necessary for admission under the
Confrontation Clause. 7 2
3. The Ninth Circuit Approach
In United States v. Aguilar, the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning
of the Second and Seventh Circuits. 7 3  The court held that the
admission of a plea allocution does not violate the Confrontation
Clause where the allocution
(1) is made under oath and with the representation of counsel, (2) is
entered personally before a district judge who accepts the plea under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, (3) includes
166. Id.
167. Id. But see United States v. Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135, 1140 n.3 (7th Cir. 1993)
(suggesting that, in cases of exculpatory statements against penal interest, the
motivation to curry favor with authorities could be inferred from a plea bargain in
which declarant agreed to cooperate with the government in return for a government
recommendation of a reduction in sentence).
168. Centracchio, 265 F.3d at 527-30.
169. Id. at 529 (citing United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Petrillo, 237 F.3d
119 (2d Cir. 2000)).
170. Id. This view is at odds with the presumed unreliability of accomplice
statements made to authorities. See supra Part I.C.
171. Centracchio, 265 F.3d at 529.
172. Id. at 529-30. The "statements were genuinely self-inculpatory and did not
seek to downplay his own role, [were made with] the benefit of counsel,.., under
oath in front of a federal judge, with no promise of leniency, and risking a prison
term, and [were accompanied by] the limiting instruction proposed by the
government." Id. at 529.
173. United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002). The defendant
did not dispute that the allocutions were statements against interest for the purposes
of Rule 804(b)(3). Id. at 1020. The court addressed only the Confrontation Clause
issue. Id.
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wholly self-inculpatory remarks, and (4) subjects the declarant to a
risk of substantial imprisonment. A guilty plea that meets these
criteria possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
sufficient to justify depriving the defendant of the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine the declarant.1
74
The court found that the allocutions at issue "derive[d] considerable
reliability as statements against penal interest" because the
"declarants embraced potentially long prison terms by pleading guilty,
and.., the evidence suggests no consideration was promised in return
for those pleas. ' 175 Additionally, the allocutions "were made under
oath, with the advice of counsel, and in the presence of the same
district judge who presided over [defendant's] trial," thus adding to
the reliability of the statements. 76 The Ninth Circuit found that the
district judge was "well-positioned to assess [each declarant's]
credibility" because he adhered to the requirements of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 77 Such requirements ensured
that each declarant was aware of the lengthy imprisonment he or she
potentially faced under the terms of the plea.178
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the other circuits' use of the
limiting instruction as a factor in determining the reliability of an
allocution.1 79 The court found that a "jury instruction that may come
months or years after a codefendant's guilty plea is not a
'circumstance surrounding the making of a statement.""'18 The Ninth
Circuit therefore "depart[ed] from the Second and Seventh Circuits in
this minor regard.""18
Though the court concluded that the "decision does not create a per
se rule permitting the admission of a ... guilty plea," '82 any plea
allocution meeting the outlined criteria ordinarily will be admitted. 83
B. Plea Allocutions Found Not Sufficiently Reliable Despite an Oath, a
Judge, and a Potentially Long Sentence
The circuits admitting plea allocutions assume that a guilty plea is a
statement against interest where the declarant, by making the
174. Id. at 1019 (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 1022.
176. Id. at 1023.
177. Id.
178. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that Rule 11 is "meant to ensure that a guilty plea
is knowing and voluntary," and "not the result of... promises apart from a plea
agreement." Id. at 1020, 1023. A plea may be entirely voluntary and still bear little
resemblance to the truth. See Goldstein, supra note 128; infra Part III.A.2.a.
179. Aguilar, 295 F.3d at 1023.
180. Id. (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990)).
181. Id.; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
182. Aguilar, 295 F.3d at 1024.
183. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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statement, potentially faces a lengthy imprisonment."84 In addition,
these circuits find the circumstances of the plea hearing-that the
allocution is made under oath and in the presence of a judge-to be
significant assurances of the statement's reliability. 85 While no other
circuit court has made a decision on the admissibility of a guilty plea
as a statement against interest, 186 state courts, including the highest
courts of two states, have found plea allocutions to be unreliable
under Lilly.
In State v. King, the Supreme Court of Minnesota considered the
admissibility of a plea allocution for which the declarant did not
receive a reduced sentence.87 The court found the Confrontation
Clause issue dispositive and did not rule on admissibility under an
exception to the hearsay rule.8 8 The court noted the incentive for the
prosecution to "use testimony from a guilty plea setting, which is
under the direct control of the prosecutor and requires disclosing only
the basic elements of the offense necessary for the court to accept the
plea."' 89  The plea allocution's consistency with a prior custodial
statement, made "when [the declarant] arguably was seeking to curry
favor with the investigators," suggested its unreliability. 9 ° The court
found that only the oath weighed in favor of admissibility, whereas the
benefits granted to the declarant and the inherent unreliability of
accomplice statements weighed against admissibility. 91 The court
held that the unredacted plea allocution was inadmissible in light of
these circumstances. 92
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Garrison v. State, found an
allocution to be unreliable based upon the circumstances.'93 The court
184. See supra notes 143, 166, 175 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 143, 166, 176 and accompanying text.
186. So far, one district court has found that the "claim that declarant's statements
under oath before the Court during his change of plea hearing are a guarantee of
trustworthiness fails to take into account the complexity and multiplicity of factors
that coincide at a stage in a criminal process when a defendant self convicts." United
States v. Lopez-Caceres, 89 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172 (D.P.R. 1999).
187. State v. King, 622 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2001). The plea allocution mentioned
the defendant by name. See id. at 807 n.2. The court interpreted Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion in Lilly as finding all statements against interest to be violations of
the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 809 n.3. This does not seem to comport with Justice
Scalia's requirement that evidence be formalized and testimonial (e.g., not made to a
friend) in order for the Clause to apply. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143 (1999)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Guilty plea testimony, however,
would seem to violate the Clause under Justice Scalia's view.
188. King, 622 N.W.2d at 806.
189. Id. at 808 (reserving judgment on whether declarant was unavailable and
deciding only whether the plea testimony had adequate indicia of reliability).
190. Id. at 809.
191. Id. at 808-09. The State agreed only to recommend a sentence at the bottom
of the range for declarant's offense. The declarant did not receive a reduced sentence
but was released from custody pending sentencing. Id. at 809.
192. Id. at 809.
193. Garrison v. State, 726 So. 2d 1144, 1149 (Miss. 1998).
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considered the circumstances in which the statement had been made
without deciding first whether the statement was in any way against
the declarant's interest.194 The court noted that the declarant had
been under oath and had made a statement against penal interest, but
found it significant that the declarant "attempted to shift as much
blame as possible away from herself to get a more lenient sentence."' 95
Although she potentially faced, and in fact received, a sentence of life
imprisonment, the court concluded that the declarant thought she
would receive a significantly shorter sentence by pleading guilty. 96
Additionally, the allocution differed in several respects from the
testimony of her two accomplices, and was later recanted. 9 7 The
Mississippi Supreme Court found that the circumstances of the
testimony itself, combined with the subsequent recantation, weighed
against a finding of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
necessary for admission under the Confrontation Clause.'98 The court
held that admission of the testimony, which "explicitly detailed" the
defendant's alleged role in the crime, was reversible error.199
In People v. Baker, a Michigan Court of Appeals held the
incriminatory portions of a plea allocution to be inadmissible though
the statement was made under oath and subjected its declarant to life
imprisonment." The court first acknowledged that the statement was
clearly against the declarant's penal interest and determined that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have
implicated himself in the crime of murder without that statement
being true.2"' The court ruled, however, that the portions of the
statement that inculpated the defendant were not against penal
interest because "those statements could have been made by a
reasonable person in the co-defendant's position regardless of their
truth or falsity. 2112
The court began its hearsay analysis with the presumption that the
statement was unreliable.2 3 The statement, though made in court,
was "made to authorities in a custodial setting. '' 21 4 The court deemed
the statement voluntary. Nevertheless, because it was not made at the
declarant's own initiative, the court found it less trustworthy than if
had it been made to friends or family. 21°5 Furthermore, the statement
194. Id. at 1148.
195. Id.
196, Id. at 1148-49.
197. Id. at 1149.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1149-50.
200. People v. Baker, No. 226569, 2002 WL 362837, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 1,
2002).
201. Id. at *3.
202. Id.
203. Id. at *4.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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consisted of the declarant's responses to leading questions by the
prosecution.2 °6 Finally, the statement minimized the declarant's
culpability by shifting blame to the defendant.2 °7
In Baker, the court determined that "once the co-defendant decided
to acknowledge his guilt and became aware that he faced no further
penalty, there was little incentive for him to speak truthfully.
2 8
Moreover, the declarant still had the incentive to minimize his own
role in the crime, and his statement shifted most of the blame of the
crime to the defendant. 209 The court concluded that portions of the
statement that incriminated the defendant could not qualify as
statements against interest.210
The court then held that, regardless of the admissibility under the
rules of evidence, admission of these portions violated the defendant's
confrontation right.211 The court evaluated the plea allocution under
the factors outlined by the Michigan Supreme Court for admission of
statements against penal interest that inculpate persons in addition to
the speaker.2 12 Admission would be favored if the statement was
made voluntarily, made contemporaneously with the facts asserted,
made to "someone to whom the declarant would likely speak the
truth," and made "spontaneously at the initiation of the declarant and
without prompting or inquiry by the listener. ' 213 Weighing against
admission would be a finding that the statement was "made to law
enforcement officers or at the prompting or inquiry of the listener,"
minimized the declarant's culpability or shifted blame to another, was
made for revenge or to curry favor, and was accompanied by a finding
that the speaker was motivated to lie or distort the facts.214 Based on
these factors, the court found that the statement "inescapabl[y]"
violated the Confrontation Clause.215
C. The Analyses of Other Circuit Courts
Other circuits have not addressed whether an accomplice's plea
allocution may be admitted against a defendant. Most circuits have
examined other statements made by an accomplice to the
government-for example, those made while under direct
examination, made to a grand jury, made in an administrative
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at *4-5 (citing People v. Poole, 506 N.W.2d 505 (Mich. 1993)). The
declarant must, of course, be found unavailable. Id. at *4.
213. Id. at *5.
214. Id.
215. Id. The Court found the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and
affirmed the conviction. Id.
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proceeding, and, of course, those made while in police custody.
Generally, these courts closely examine the motivations of the
declarant under the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether a statement is against the speaker's interest. Whether these
courts will apply the same analysis to an accomplice's plea allocution
remains to be seen.
1. Direct Examination
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Deeb found a facially self-
inculpating statement made while under direct examination
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. 16  Although the
statement was made in open court, under oath, and in the presence of
a judge, the court noted that the trustworthiness of a statement was
not guaranteed by "the mere fact that [it was] made under oath." '217
Though the statement was facially against interest, the declarant "had
a strong motive to testify in a manner that would win him favor with
the Government, and he could achieve that goal by inculpating [the
defendant] as the principal conspirator."2 8  The court found the
statement not against the declarant's interest in light of the
circumstances,219 but affirmed admission of the testimony upon a
showing that the defendant had the opportunity to offer cross-
examination of the testimony as conducted by codefendants.
220
2. Grand Jury Testimony
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Flores held that the grand jury
testimony of an accomplice or codefendant, though a statement
facially against interest, made under oath, and in a "noncustodial,
formal setting," lacked indicia of reliability sufficient to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause. 221 The court noted that if the oath and formal
setting were sufficient, "'Congress could have dispensed with the
cross-examination requirement codified in Rule 804(b)(1).' ' '22  The
court found it significant that most of the declarant's testimony was
given in response to leading questions and concluded that "accomplice
or codefendant grand jury testimony, in and of itself, does not exhibit
sufficient indicia of reliability. '223 Thus, the Fifth Circuit has held that
216. United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 1541 (11th Cir. 1994). The court found a
cooperator's direct examination testimony admissible where the defendant had the
opportunity to introduce testimony of the cross-examination from the same
proceeding and conducted by his codefendants. Id. at 1539-41.
217. Id. at 1538 (citing United States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618, 623 (11th Cir. 1990)).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1541.
221. United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770, 776 n.14 (5th Cir. 1993).
222. Id. (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir. 1989)).
223. Id. at 777 (citing Garner v. United States, 439 U.S. 936, 938 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
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a non-custodial statement against interest, given under oath, is not
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Gomez-Lemos, held that the
"mere fact that [declarants] gave testimony under oath, in the
'relatively solemn setting' of a grand jury proceeding, does not
guarantee the trustworthiness of their statements implicating
defendant." '224 The court noted that the Supreme Court consistently
has held "the uncross-examined testimony of an alleged co-
conspirator" insufficiently reliable for admission under the
Confrontation Clause.225 The Sixth Circuit found no extraordinary
circumstances in the offered grand jury testimony that would rebut
this "strong" presumption of unreliability.226
The court in Gomez-Lemos also concluded that the desire to curry
favor with the government does not end after a declarant has entered
into a plea agreement, and not even after sentencing, because "the
government still possesses influence regarding the security level and
location of the prison where the [declarant] is to be incarcerated."227
The court then found that allowing the use of extrajudicial
statements "creates a powerful incentive" for the prosecution to plan
for the unavailability of declarants so as to prevent confrontation.228
The panel of judges noted, "[i]t is much easier to plan a trial and
convince a jury of a contested set of facts if the jury hears only the
direct testimony from one side." '229 The Sixth Circuit, holding that the
oath alone was insufficient to guarantee reliability of a non-custodial
statement under the Confrontation Clause, reversed and remanded
for a new trial.230
3. Custodial Statements
The Third Circuit in United States v. Boyce held that the proponent
of a custodial statement against interest must show that the declarant
"was not motivated by a desire to curry favor" with the government.231
dissenting from denial of certiorari) for the premise that testimony given in front of a
grand jury is not particularly reliable, because such testimony permits leading
questions and multiple hearsay without cross-examination of witnesses).
224. United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Tolbert v. Jago, 607 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1979) (Engel, J., concurring)). But see,
e.g., Curro v. United States, 4 F.3d 436, 437 (6th Cir. 1993) (admitting grand jury
testimony as a statement against interest).
225. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d at 332.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 333.
228. Id.
229. Id.; see also Douglass, supra note 83, at 1814 (arguing that courts should use
"the constitutional power to exclude hearsay... to compel the prosecution to act
where necessary to allow for fair testing of hearsay").
230. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d at 334.
231. United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir. 1988); see also United States
v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding error in admission of statement
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Evidence that the government would recommend significant
sentencing concessions as the result of declarant's later plea bargain
increased the likelihood of unreliability.232  The court held that
admission of the statement constituted an abuse of discretion under
the totality of the circumstances and a prejudicial error that required
reversal of defendant's convictions.233
The Sixth Circuit addressed the admissibility of custodial
confessions in United States v. McCleskey.3 The court found that a
custodial confession, inculpating the defendant, is "classic,
inadmissible hearsay, when offered by the government, regardless of
the constitutional concern. '235 The declarant had been advised of his
rights, had made a voluntary confession, and had received no express
promise of leniency for cooperation. 236 The court found that these
safeguards were applicable to the reliability of the statement only
respecting its use against the declarant, and not respecting its use
against the defendant. 237 Because the declarant had "a strong interest
in shifting at least some of the responsibility from himself" to the
defendant, the Sixth Circuit held that such a statement cannot be
considered to be against its declarant's interest.2 38  The court
additionally found that the admission violated the defendant's
confrontation rights for the same reasons. 39
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Hazelett found that
statements inculpating the defendant, made after a declarant's
''conviction was assured," probably were "motivated by 'the very
natural desire to curry favor . . . [and] the desire to alleviate
culpability by implicating others.""'24 The defendant had "nothing to
lose" and much to gain from pointing to defendant's culpability.2 4'
The court held that, under the circumstances, the statements were not
sufficiently against the declarant's interest, and the lower court's
holding to the contrary was reversible error.242
when there was a "very real danger that the motivation" for the statement, made after
police had already found cocaine on declarant, may have been to "curry favor with
the authorities").
232. Boyce, 849 F.2d at 836-37.
233. Id. at 837.
234. 228 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2000).
235. Id. at 645.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. United States v. Hazelett, 32 F.3d 1313, 1318 (8th Cir. 1994) (alterations in
original) (quoting United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1384 (8th Cir. 1981)).
241. Id. at 1318.
242. Id. at 1319. The statement was the only direct evidence against the defendant
to show possession of cocaine. Id.
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In United States v. Costa,243 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a
declarant, knowing that the government had a strong case against him,
had nothing to lose and much to gain by naming the defendants as his
coconspirators. 2" The court found that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position "might well have been motivated to misrepresent
the role of others in the criminal enterprise, and might well have
viewed the statement inculpating the defendants to be in his interest
rather than against it."'2" The statement was not genuinely against the
declarant's interest because it directly implicated the defendants.246
Because the statement was the only direct evidence against the
defendants, the court reversed the convictions of the defendants and
remanded for a new trial.247
III. AN ACCOMPLICE'S PLEA ALLOCUTION IS GENERALLY IN THE
INTEREST OF ITS DECLARANT AND ADMISSION OF SUCH
STATEMENTS SHOULD BE BARRED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND
UNDER A PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES
The courts that have admitted plea allocutions as statements against
interest have virtually ignored the plea bargaining process. An
examination of the plea bargaining process shows that an alleged
coconspirator's allocution-the only kind of allocution used against
another defendant-is generally in the interest of its declarant. The
arbitrary admission of such statements violates the Confrontation
Clause and improperly circumvents the Federal Rules. Section A of
this part argues that the unavailable accomplice's plea allocution is
not a statement against interest and is inherently unreliable because of
the blame-shifting incentives present in the plea bargaining process.
The oath and the presence of a judge cannot counter this inherent
unreliability, and such statements should be barred under the
Confrontation Clause. Section B offers the alternative argument that
admission of a third person's guilty plea to prove an element of a
crime against the accused circumvents the legislative intent of the
Federal Rules. Therefore, plea allocutions ordinarily should be
barred under the Rules.
243. 31 F,3d 1073 (11th Cir. 1994).
244, Id. at 1079.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1080. Although the confession was inadmissible under 804(b)(3)
because of its direct inculpation of defendants, the court suggested that the confession
would be admissible if it only implicated the defendants indirectly-if the jury were to
infer indirectly from declarant's "knowledge of the cocaine and the defendants'
presence in Alabama with [declarant], that the defendants also knew of the cocaine."
Id. at 1079.
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A. An Accomplice's Plea Allocution Is Generally a Statement in the
Interest of the Declarant and Presumptively Unreliable
The fact that a statement is truly against interest makes it more
reliable, 48 and is one of the guarantees of trustworthiness that
supports its admissibility under the Confrontation Clause. 49
Plea allocutions only facially qualify as statements against
interest.25° Whether a statement is truly against interest depends on
the circumstances. 2 1 Commentators and the Supreme Court have
found statements to be in the declarant's interest where he or she had
the opportunity to curry favor with the government for a lenient
sentence.2 2
Furthermore, an accomplice's allocution is the product of a process
that encourages the fabrication of testimony. 253 As such, accomplice
plea allocutions are inherently unreliable and their admission violates
the Confrontation Clause, regardless of the safeguards of the plea
hearing and later redaction.
1. An Accomplice's Allocution Is Generally in the Interest of Its
Declarant
The plea bargaining process has been criticized at length.2 14
Defendants, defense counsel, and prosecutors have many incentives to
negotiate a guilty plea. The guilty plea, in effect, is a bargain in the
best possible interests of all involved. 5 The rewards for a defendant
of responding to government influence are too great to pass up.256
The accomplice is in the perfect position to reap the great rewards of
cooperation, and he or she likely will use fabricated testimony if it will
result in a better deal.257
248. See supra Part I.A.
249. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
250. See United States v. Winley, 638 F.2d 560, 562 (2d cir. 1981).
251. See supra Part I.
252. See supra Part I.
253. See infra Part III.A.I.
254. E.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 Cal. L.
Rev. 652 (1981); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining As Disaster, 101 Yale L.J.
1979 (1992).
255. Goldstein, supra note 128, at 33; Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for
Snitches, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 563, 625 (1999) (concluding that "cooperation is simply too
attractive to all the players in the system, and they generally gain these advantages at
little or no personal cost").
256. See infra Part III.A.l.a.
257. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
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a. The Rewards of Pleading Guilty
A defendant arguably will be rewarded for responding to the
influence of the government,258 even in a simple guilty plea. 59 The
guilty plea is "conditioned on receipt of a sentencing discount. ' '26 The
inducement to plead can be a sentence reduction by as much as almost
forty percent. 6' To quote the Mississippi Supreme Court: "It may be
readily seen then that, in [declarant's] mind a guilty plea might
engender favorable treatment even to the extent of reducing a
sentence of life imprisonment to one of one year in the county jail. 262
258. For federal offenses, sentences are determined by the Sentencing Guidelines:
[A] sentencing "range" (expressed in months in prison, including no prison
time for some ranges) is established based on a so-called "Offense Level"
(expressed as a certain number of points on the vertical axis of a
"Sentencing Table") and a so-called "Criminal History Category"
(represented on the horizontal axis of the same "Sentencing Table"). The
intersection of the particular "Offense Level" and "Criminal History
Category" on the Sentencing Table produces the sentencing range, The
presiding judge must give the defendant a determinate sentence within the
Sentencing Guidelines range unless the judge finds a legally sufficient
reason for "departure" from the range.
G. Nicholas Herman, Plea Bargaining § 7:02 (1997 & Supp. 2001). Entering a plea of
guilty entitles the defendant to a reduction, or downward departure, for "acceptance
of responsibility," resulting in a two-level reduction from his or her offense level. Id. §
7:07 (noting that the two-level reduction is available "so long as the defendant admits
'or does not falsely deny[]' the 'Relevant Conduct' in connection with the offense of
conviction" (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1, cmt. n.1 (1987))
(alteration in original)).
In 1999, those who were convicted after going to trial received, on average, 155.4
months of prison time. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999
Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics 64. Those opting to plea received an
average of 52.3 months. Id. "Drug offenders convicted at trial received an average of
209.7 months as compared to the 67.9 months for drug offenders convicted by guilty
plea. Violent offenders who went to trial received an average sentence of 163.4
months as compared to the 80.6 months for those convicted by plea." Id.
259. "[M]ost defendants take this course, usually in exchange for a sentencing
discount." Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69, 71-72 (1995).
Professor Richman frames the ordinary plea decision as a contract in which the
"benefit of [the] bargain" is a binding "sentencing concession," in contrast with the
uncertainty of a cooperation agreement. Id. at 91-96. Other commentators have
noted that "the defendants who pay the heaviest penalties under the current regime
[are those] who refuse to bargain, go to trial, and are convicted." Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1933 (1992).
260. Richman, supra note 259, at 71 n.11 (finding the plea "hardly an indication of
true atonement").
261. Weinstein, supra note 255, at 566 n.12 (discussing incentives to plead guilty
under federal sentencing guidelines).
262. Garrison v. State, 726 So. 2d 1144, 1148-49 (Miss. 1998) (finding the
declarant's guilty plea inadmissible though it had been made under oath and in the
presence of her attorney because it lacked sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness
under the Confrontation Clause); see also Williams v. State, 667 So. 2d 15, 21 (Miss.
1996) ("Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the declarant's motive
to fabricate ... , this statement fails under Confrontation Clause analysis and should
not be admitted.").
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The expected benefit of a sentencing discount may induce a defendant
into making a possibly false263 and "self-serving" statement.2 6
This reduction, though significant, still may result in a long prison
sentence. 6' Therefore, "virtually all defendants are keenly
interested" in the possibility of a greater sentence reduction.266 In
federal cases, the most significant reduction, or "downward
departure," is based on negotiating for a cooperation agreement, or a
departure based on "substantial assistance. ' 267 This option is available
only to those who are in the position to implicate others.268 In a case
involving more than one defendant, the prosecution is often willing to
give one or more codefendants the option of cooperation,269 for which
the reward is a lesser sentence than that of the defendant who pleads
guilty without the option of cooperating.270 Professor Richman finds
that defendants have "extraordinary incentives to cooperate. 271
Professor Weinstein agrees: "[C]ooperation is the most likely, and
often the only realistic chance, a defendant has to get a sentence
below the [statutory] range. 2 72 Depending on the jurisdiction, even
greater leniency may lie outside the Sentencing Guidelines, through
the use of charge and fact bargaining.2 73
263. Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
Hastings L.J. 957, 985-86 (1989); see also T. Kenneth Moran & John L. Cooper,
Discretion and the Criminal Justice Process 59 (1983) (finding that although "[p]lea
bargaining ensures the fact that an accused party is punished[,] this does not mean
that the person was guilty").
264. McMunigal, supra note 263, at 986; see Moran & Cooper, supra note 263, at 75
("The certainty of less punishment can be very persuasive to an accused .. .
265. Weinstein, supra note 255, at 575-76.
266. Id. at 576.
267. The "most significant... downward departure [is] based on providing
'substantial assistance."' Herman, supra note 258, § 7:08.
268. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994). A cooperator provides "substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person." Id.
269. See generally Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With Federal Prosecutors:
Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 917 (1999)
(finding from numerous anecdotal accounts by prosecutors that cooperators'
incentives and opportunities to lie often result in fabricated testimony that
prosecutors wrongly believe to be true).
270. "[T]he snitch can expect a far more lenient sentence than he would have
received had he merely pleaded guilty." Richman, supra note 259, at 72. For example,
"[t]he benefits of cooperation are dramatic for narcotics defendants, at least when
their sentences are compared to sentences of similarly charged defendants who do not
cooperate. [An analysis of data] reveals an average sentence reduction of over five
years for.., defendants who gain cooperation departures." Weinstein, supra note
255, at 581.
271. Richman, supra note 259, at 78 (noting that although governments have
always given special leniency to snitches, those rewards "seem particularly great in
these days of lengthy sentences"). Cooperation "opens the possibility of a dramatic
sentence reduction, all the way down to the gold standard-a sentence of no prison
time at all." Weinstein, supra note 255, at 577-78.
272. Weinstein, supra note 255, at 577.
273. Id. at 608. Prosecutors consider sentencing in their charging decisions and
"engage in sentence fact and factor bargaining." Ian Weinstein, Sinful Sentencing:
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Even in the case of defendants who would not plead guilty, their
attorneys may encourage bargaining for a plea. The defense attorney
has "powerful incentives to avoid trial." '274 The vast majority of
defense attorneys work either at a flat fee or low hourly rates, with
low caps on total compensation." 5 "[P]revailing pathologies of the
criminal justice system suggest that defense attorneys, whether
retained or appointed, have strong incentives to push clients into plea
bargains, with little thought to the clients' interests."'276 A defendant
may be pushed into a plea bargain, even if he or she ordinarily would
have wanted a trial.277
b. Prosecutorial Incentives to Offer Attractive Plea Bargains
There are no systemic checks on plea negotiations that would
ensure that resulting plea allocutions are an accurate reflection of
reality.278 The chief prosecutor may seek to "enhance her reputation
and her political standing" by ensuring a "high conviction rate" and
"an absence of high-profile trial losses. 2 79  Prosecutors attain both
The Wages of Overcriminalization and Harsh Mandatory Sentences Are Injustice 46
(Aug. 26, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citing Lisa M. Farabee,
Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two
Districts, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 569, 629 (1998); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel,
Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention
and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 N.W. U. L. Rev. 1284 (1997);
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 231 (1989)). A
prosecutor's unreviewable charging decisions and fact bargaining leave "defendants
[with] nowhere else to look for mercy but to the prosecutor." Id. at 18-19, 39.
274. Schulhofer, supra note 254, at 1988.
275. Id. at 1988-89; Moran & Cooper, supra note 263, at 65, 75-76.
276. Richman, supra note 259, at 110-26 (but finding that, despite this, defense
attorneys "do not routinely sell out their clients"); see Moran & Cooper, supra note
263, at 65. "Assigned defense lawyers are much more amiable to a deal with the
prosecution. [T]he poor[,] who are more than likely to have assigned counsel[,] are
most likely to suffer because of this .... Id.
277. See Moran & Cooper, supra note 263, at 64. "[Slince the accused is made to
believe that his lawyer is interested in doing the best for him,.., if the defense lawyer
tells the accused that he should agree to the bargain, he is likely, more often than not,
as the record shows, to accept the deal." Id.
278. See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 Vand.
L. Rev. 1, 16 (1992) (finding that "[t]he intensity of the dilemmas, the lonely position
of the prosecutor, and the possibility of bad decisions are good reasons for seeking
some mechanism for review" of bargaining procedures); Schulhofer, supra note 254,
at 1990-91 (arguing that that the contract theory of plea bargaining fails to account for
the lack of any "market-like solutions" for massive agency costs); Weinstein, supra
note 255, at 625-26 (concluding that "[c]ooperation's significant costs in sentencing
inequity, damage to the adversarial system and governmental encouragement of
morally problematic behavior are almost entirely externalized and offer no check
upon the buyers and sellers").
279. Schulhofer, supra note 254, at 1987; see Moran & Cooper, supra note 263, at
60; see also Hughes, supra note 278, at 67 (finding that "[t]he prosecutor's delicate and
difficult obligation to enforce the criminal laws... sometimes is in danger of being
clouded by public and private pressures and by personal ambition").
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goals through the use of guilty pleas.2" Additionally, prosecutorial
trial success, as a "key measure" of performance, pressures front-line
prosecutors to seek as much evidence as possible from pleading
cooperators.28' Plea bargaining tends to reflect varying prosecutorial
incentives that differ from the public's interest in law enforcement,
resulting in "unduly lenient sentence offers. 282
Furthermore, prosecutors have substantial incentives to offer
hearsay in lieu of live testimony. As one commentator contends, "for
a prosecutor who possesses a favorable hearsay statement from an
accomplice who will make an unsavory or unpredictable witness at
trial, the [exception] gives the prosecutor an incentive to keep the
witness 'unavailable.' 283  The reality is that "[f]ew cooperating
witnesses are ideal '284 and their character actually may harm the
government's case.285  Additionally, testifying cooperators certainly
280. See Moran & Cooper, supra note 263, at 60 ("Plea bargaining does produce a
kind of conviction, a conviction that has not been legally proved, but a conviction in
the statistical records of the prosecutor's office."); Schulhofer, supra note 254, at 1987
(finding that the chief prosecutor will "more often ... want to ensure settlement, even
if this requires overly generous plea offers"); Weinstein, supra note 255, at 597
(noting that the "numbers of pleading defendants.., form a persuasive argument to
others that they too should not contest their cases").
281. Weinstein, supra note 255, at 596-97.
282. Shulhofer, supra note 254, at 1988; see also Hughes, supra note 278, at 14
(finding that "prosecutors often are ready to make full immunity deals with respect to
serious 'victimless' crimes ... in which the public does not so clearly hear the voices of
an individual victim and his family crying for retribution").
283. Douglass, supra note 83, at 1812. The accomplice can be put on the witness
stand at the discretion of the prosecutor. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297,
1301-02 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that United States Attorney's Office may offer
leniency for truthful testimony of an accomplice without violating statute). Professor
Douglass points out that "the power to immunize a witness or to bargain in exchange
for testimony is the prosecutor's alone. Courts almost never look behind the exercise
of that power, even where the prosecutor's decisions seem calculated to make
confrontation impossible." Douglass, supra note 83, at 1806 (footnotes omitted).
Because only the prosecution has the power to compel live testimony, "nothing
promotes [the] option [of] presenting hearsay along with the live, unvarnished
testimony of an immunized accomplice who has not become a sycophant of the
prosecutor." Id. at 1811-12.
The Supreme Court has found a defendant to be denied the right of confrontation
when a declarant has exercised the privilege against self-incrimination. Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1965). The Court has never determined whether the
prosecution can be found to have sustained its burden of showing unavailability in the
same circumstances. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 n.1 (1999). But see generally
Douglass, supra note 83 (arguing that neither the defense nor the prosecution wants
the live testimony of most co-conspirator declarants, and the battle over unavailability
is really about the admissibility of evidence). Professor Douglass finds that the live
testimony of the declarant in Lilly similarly was not sought after. Douglass, supra note
83, at 1800 n.8. Douglass also discusses the impracticality of trying and sentencing a
declarant as a way of extinguishing the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 1826 n.124.
284. Weinstein, supra note 255, at 599; see Douglass, supra note 83, at 1815.
285. Douglass, supra note 83, at 1848 ("[P]rosecutors rightly fear that an unsavory
witness may taint their whole case."); Hughes, supra note 278, at 39-40 ("[A]cquittals
by juries are sometimes attributable, at least in part, either to skepticism about the
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will face impeachment with evidence of the cooperation agreement
and their self-interest in testifying against the accused.286 The use of
guilty pleas avoids this showcasing of the prosecution's distasteful
alliances. 87 Impeachment of the hearsay evidence is also avoided,
though available to the defense.21  Finally, the guilty plea has an aura
of reliability as a statement facially against the declarant's interest,
despite circumstances that may not be fully comprehended by a
jury.289
c. Substantial Government Influence on the Substance of the Allocution
Further Undermines Its Reliability
Even outside the standard cooperation context, the prosecution
arguably has considerable influence on the content of a plea
allocution. In return for the sentence discount, the declarant's part of
the bargain is to allocute as "specified" by the prosecution and in a
way that fits the prosecution's version of the facts.29 ° In the typical
cooperation scenario, the prosecutor often will dictate or prepare the
allocution itself.2 91
Implicit forms of government influence are inherent in the
accomplice scenario, and are central to the questionable reliability of
accomplice incrimination.292 As Professor Hughes contends, the
credibility of cooperating witnesses who, in addition to their confessed participation
in the instant crime, may also have extensive criminal records, or to revulsion at the
sources of the prosecution's case.").
286. Weinstein, supra note 255, at 599.
287. Professor Douglas notes that "juries seldom hear from [an accomplice] unless
his story is coerced through a grant of immunity, induced by a favorable plea bargain,
or-as in Lilly-presented to the jury in the form of hearsay." Douglass, supra note
83, at 1816.
288. Defense counsel generally avoid the impeachment of hearsay evidence, an
alternative under Rule 806 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Douglass, supra note 85,
at 193 n.9. Various reasons for failing to pursue impeachment may include a decision
not to use limited resources on an all-or-nothing battle over admissibility,
expectations that the jury will discount hearsay evidence, and maintenance of "a
'pure' denial-of-confrontation issue for de novo review on appeal, rather than a
record showing that counsel sought and obtained the functional equivalent of
confrontation." Id. at 221-24. Though the fight over admissibility seems to be
strategically preferred by defense attorneys, Professor Douglass finds that most
hearsay is more reliable and less prosecution-tainted than the polished testimony of
an available accomplice-cooperator. Douglass, supra note 83, at 1828-39.
289. Cross-examination of the declarant ideally would "impeach the accomplice by
demonstrating bias toward the defendant, prior convictions, prior inconsistent
statements, a self-serving motive, or an untrustworthy character." Douglass, supra
note 83, at 1864.
290. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 259, at 1954.
291. See, e.g., United States v. Centracchio, 265 F.3d 518, 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2001)
(finding a plea allocution "entirely prepared by the government" to be trustworthy
regardless of declarant's possible incentive to "get a good deal").
292. Professor Douglass notes that the self-inculpatory nature of the cooperator's
statement-the very basis for crediting the cooperator's statement with any
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"temptation to lie in cooperation agreement cases is not just a natural
feature of the landscape but specifically is introduced or inflated by the
government when it offers immunity or leniency in return for
cooperation."'293 The accomplice, who possesses inside information,
may find it easy to convincingly fabricate evidence.294 Fabrication of a
few details, if necessary, can be well worth the rewards of cooperating
with the government.
An accomplice will swear in court to the words of the adversary if it
results in a great deal.295 It is not a stretch to conclude that the same
declarants would, or do, swear to testimony fabricated at least in
part.296  These allocutions are later offered into evidence by the
prosecution when the declarant is found to be unavailable.297
An incriminating plea allocution is the product of the accomplice's
desire for shifting blame, and is coached, if not written, by a
prosecutor with an eye towards its use against another defendant.
Both parties have the same goal, that of establishing a record against
another person. In the cooperation context, a testifying cooperator's
lies are often used against others in court.29' The plea allocution is no
exception.
reliability-is highly suspect when such a statement is made to prosecutors: "When it
comes to reliability, the fact that parts of the confession are self-inculpatory is almost
incidental. It is difficult to 'finger' your criminal colleague without admitting some
participation in the crime yourself." Douglass, supra note 83, at 1828.
293. Hughes, supra note 278, at 35 (emphasis added). "Accomplices, if they give
information ... may have a natural tendency to lie in order to minimize their part in
the crime. A promise of leniency in exchange for cooperation surely enhances that
tendency." Id. See generally Yaroshefsky, supra note 269 (finding from numerous
anecdotal accounts by prosecutors that cooperators are eager to please prosecutors,
even to the point of making false self-incriminating statements so as to appear useful).
294. See Douglass, supra note 83, at 1837-38 ("[T]he most significant tailoring of
testimony takes place before the prosecutor ever talks to the accomplice."); Hughes,
supra note 278, at 32 ("Courts should instruct juries to consider how easily [testifying
accomplices] with inside knowledge can fabricate testimony .... ").
295. Cf. United States v. Centracchio, 265 F.3d 518, 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2001)
(finding a plea allocution "entirely prepared by the government" to be trustworthy
regardless of declarant's possible incentive to "get a good deal").
296. See generally Yaroshefsky, supra note 269 (finding from numerous anecdotal
accounts by prosecutors that cooperators' incentives and opportunities to lie often
result in fabricated testimony that prosecutors wrongly believe to be true).
297. The prosecutor ordinarily can choose whether to make a hearsay declarant
available: "Unlike most declarants, [the accomplice's] live testimony can be
purchased. His silence is a bargaining chip which the prosecutor has the power to
redeem if the price is right." Douglass, supra note 83, at 1804 (citing United States v.
Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). Professor Douglass continues,
Typically, the accomplice's story arrives in the form of hearsay as the result
of three critical pretrial choices: the choice of the accomplice to "take the
Fifth"; the choice of the prosecutor not to immunize or entice the
accomplice into live testimony; and the choice of the defense to attack the
hearsay itself rather than to question the accomplice's silence or the
prosecutor's tactics.
Id. at 1805.
298. See generally Yaroshefsky, supra note 269.
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d. The Better View Is that the Accomplice's Allocution Is Generally a
Statement in the Interest of Its Declarant
Those circuits admitting plea allocutions have ignored the realities
of the plea bargaining process.299  As other courts have held, a
statement must be genuinely against the interest of the declarant
under the totality of the circumstances in order for it to be admitted
under the exception.3'0 These courts closely consider the motivations
of declarants.3 10
Generally, most courts find that the blame-shifting nature of most
accomplice incriminations preclude these statements from being
against a declarant's interest.30 2 Most circuits reason that a person
who has admitted no more than the government already knows has
"nothing to lose" by pointing the finger at another person's
culpability, 33 and everything to gain by cooperating with the
prosecutor. °4
These circuits have found that although a statement may be facially
against the interest of the declarant, the totality of the circumstances
in these cases has proven otherwise.3 5 Similarly, the guilty plea is
made in circumstances that belie its characterization as a statement
against interest. The declarant has nothing to lose by stating that
which the prosecutor already knows. Generally, everything in the
allocution is known or even prepared by the government.3 6
Additionally, the declarant has chosen to plead guilty after knowing
the realistic outcomes for all of his or her options. °7 In contrast to the
custodial confession, the guilty plea is the product of a bargain for
299. See supra notes 150-51, 167 and accompanying text.
300. See supra Part II.B-C.
301. See supra Part II.B-C.
302. See supra Part II.B-C.
303. See supra Part II.B-C.
304. See supra Part III.A.l.a.
305. See supra Part I.B-C.
306. See supra Part III.A.l.c.
307. See supra Part III.A.l.a. Cf United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273
(5th Cir. 1977).
A complete reading of the grand jury transcript discloses that the witness
was closely weighing whether it would be better for him to testify under the
circumstances, or not to testify. He obviously decided it was to his best
interest to testify. Given the prosecutor's offer of immunity for offenses
concerning this marijuana transaction, the only civil or criminal liability that
he could face at the time would occut if he did not testify. Thus whether he
told the truth or not was incidental to what would happen to him if he did
not say something. If he answered the questions at the time, he would be
free of the threat of contempt. The important thing to him was that he gave
an answer, be it truth or not. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said
that "a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement
unless he believed it to be true."
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which the declarant knows the rewards.3"8 In the case of a cooperating
codefendant, there are even greater rewards for choosing the liability
of a guilty plea over that of not pleading and going to trial.309 A plea
allocution, under most circumstances, is made in the interest of its
declarant.
2. An Accomplice's Allocution Is Presumptively Unreliable Despite
the Safeguards of the Plea Hearing and Any Subsequent Redaction,
and Its Admission Violates the Confrontation Clause
The previous section of this Note concluded that a plea allocution,
particularly that of the cooperator, generally is made in the interest of
its declarant. The next part of this Note finds that the plea hearing
process and redaction of the allocution do not add to the reliability of
the plea allocution. The plea allocution, therefore, is not any more
reliable than ordinary hearsay.
Furthermore, an accomplice's guilty plea is presumptively
unreliable under the Lilly plurality's reliability approach. This section
concludes that the admission of such statements violates the
Confrontation Clause under both the reliability and the testimonial
approaches of the majority of the Lilly Court.
a. The Plea Hearing Does Not Add Reliability to a Plea Allocution
For the defendant about to receive a deep sentencing discount in
exchange for his guilty plea, the allocution is simply an extension of
the plea negotiations.31 As one commentator has concluded: "The
plea is explicitly the product of a bargain in which each party is acting
for his own benefit." '' The oath and the participation of the judge
are incidental to the process.3"2 "[B]y the time the plea is tendered to
the court, [a] defendant likely has at least partly executed the
cooperation agreement by debriefing, or has executed it fully by
testimony before a grand jury or at a trial."3"3  The plea hearing,
therefore, comes too late in the process to act as an effective
safeguard of the allocution's reliability.
308. See supra note 259.
309. See supra Part II.A.l.a.
310. Cf. Hughes, supra note 278, at 56 ("Until the plea is consummated . it is
merely an executory contract without the constitutional significance to compel
judicial intervention." (citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1983))).
311. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Denial of Justice: Criminal Process in the United States 78
(1977) (emphasis added).
312. Hedieh Nasheri, Betrayal of Due Process: A Comparative Assessment of Plea
Bargaining in the United States and Canada 34 (1998) (finding that the participation
of the judge is necessary only to establish for the record the voluntary nature of the
declarant's statement and to "effect" the plea bargain).
313. Hughes, supra note 278, at 18.
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The declarant in a guilty plea proceeding is most likely concerned
with uttering the "expected" answers that will seal the deal.314 The
last thing of which one can be certain is that the declarant is
concerned about the accuracy of his allocution.315 Making the
statement is in the declarant's best interest, and the guilty plea
proceeding is "merely a ritual"-a means to an end.316 Even the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals has acknowledged that "a guilty plea
may be affected by the exigencies of plea bargaining rather than
manifest an unequivocal admission of guilt." '317
Though a declarant is likely to be more concerned with the
consummation of a deal than with the significance of the proceedings,
no other safeguards are in place to ensure the truth of the allocution:
In the guilty plea process... the defendant normally is not cross-
examined. No jury evaluates the defendant's demeanor.
Admissions to the critical facts normally are not related within the
context of other testimony provided by the defendant. Nor is there
typically any context provided by documents, other items of physical
evidence, or the testimony of other witnesses within which to
evaluate the knowledge or the sincerity of the defendant's
confession.318
The presence of a judge also does not assure the accuracy of the
statement.31 9 In fact, the role of most judges in guilty plea proceedings
is to "ratify[] agreements reached by others.""32 The content of an
allocution, made under the terms of a plea agreement, effectively
depends on the prosecutor's conclusions about the truth of the matter,
which in turn depend, to some extent, on the declarant's version of
events.32'
314. David W. Neubauer, America's Courts and the Criminal Justice System 230
(5th ed. 1996).
315. Weinreb, supra note 311, at 78 ("So far as his interest is concerned, nothing
turns on the accuracy of his answers; all that counts is that the answers be 'right,' so
that the plea will be accepted."); see Neubauer, supra note 314, at 230.
316. Weinreb, supra note 311, at 78; see also Nasheri, supra note 312, at 34 (finding
that the judge and defendant "act out a little ritual in which statements are elicited to
show that the guilty plea is made without reservations, and without the promise of
leniency").
317. Commonwealth v. Alicia, 378 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (finding
erroneous admission of third party's guilty plea to implicate the Confrontation Clause
under Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), and reversing judgment).
318. McMunigal, supra note 263, at 970.
319. Neubauer, supra note 314, at 226 ("[Tlhe judge knows relatively little about
each case.").
320. Id.; see Herman, supra note 258, § 8:09 ("[G]iven that approximately 90% of
all criminal cases in the federal system result in guilty pleas, [the] ultimate power of
the judge to prohibit plea agreements altogether is not exercised." (footnote
omitted)).
321. Neubauer, supra note 314, at 226 ("In short, the judge is dependent on the
prosecutor and, to a lesser extent, the defense attorney."); see Scott & Stuntz, supra
note 259, at 1959 (the "judge is in a poor position to supervise the bargaining
process"); see also Yaroshefsky, supra note 269 (finding that prosecutors will
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Admitting courts point to the plea hearing as an additional
guarantee of the reliability of the allocution.322 Other courts and
commentators have found to the contrary.323 The oath alone is no
safeguard of the reliability of a cooperator's statement, even in
conjunction with a statement presumably against interest.324 The
judge's participation cannot be expected to regulate the accuracy of
the statement.325  The effect on the declarant of the presence of a
judge and the sanctity of the proceedings are incidental to the purpose
of the testimony itself-the sealing of a bargain.326  Considering the
totality of the circumstances,327 the plea hearing adds no reliability to
the negotiated allocution, and thus the allocution is no more reliable
than ordinary hearsay.
b. Redaction Is Not a Safeguard of Reliability
Admitting courts are more willing to admit a plea allocution if the
statement has been redacted.3 2s Redaction, however, usually means
just replacing the defendant's name with a neutral word.3 29 The result
is a statement inculpating another, unnamed person or persons, which
was forbidden by the Supreme Court in Williamson.33 ° When this
statement is admitted into evidence, the jury wonders how this is
relevant to the defendant.331 It is fairly easy for the jury to fill in the
gaps.332
sometimes wrongly believe and prosecute on the basis of a cooperator's version of
events).
322. See supra Part I.A.
323. See supra Part II.B.
324. See supra Part lI.B.
325. See supra Part III.A.1.d.
326. See supra Part III.A.l.d.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 55, 105.
328. See, e.g., United States v. Centracchio, 265 F.3d. 518, 525-26 (7th Cir. 2001)
(admitting a redacted allocution); United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 167 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1999) (admitting a portion of the allocution that did not name coconspirators);
United States v. Williams, 927 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1991) ("redacting all references to
the named defendants"); United States v. Chan, 184 F. Supp. 2d 337, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (admitting an allocution that did not mention the defendant by name); supra
notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 141 for a typical plea allocution.
330. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
331. Cf. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 192 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that allowing the defendant to stipulate as to an element of an
offense leads jurors to come to their own conclusions to either the detriment of the
defendant or that of the prosecution). In Old Chief, the defendant had the option of
"redaction" and the issue was not constitutional in nature.
332. The admission of redacted hearsay in the trial of only one defendant has been
found to lead a jury to conclude that a statement, even redacted of all mention of the
accused, is intended as evidence against "the only person on trial." Sanders v. Moore,
156 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (finding that the admission of the
statement, "I was contracted to go and do one," violated the Confrontation Clause
although it did not mention the accused and was only damaging when heard in
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c. An Unavailable Accomplice's Allocution Is Presumptively
Unreliable and Its Admission Violates the Confrontation Clause
Because the plea hearing and subsequent redaction cannot
ordinarily guarantee the reliability of the negotiated allocution, the
statement is no more reliable than ordinary hearsay. Accomplice
statements that incriminate others are even less reliable than ordinary
hearsay-they are presumptively unreliable.333  The Lee Court and
Lilly plurality cited Justice White's dissent in Bruton334 for the premise
that "[d]ue to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to
exonerate himself, a codefendant's statements about what the
defendant said or did are less credible than ordinary hearsay
evidence." '335 The incentive to use fabricated evidence33 6 to reap the
rewards of cooperation is central to the Supreme Court's view that
accomplice statements made to the government are presumptively
unreliable.337
The Lilly plurality determined that it was "highly unlikely that the
presumptive unreliability that attaches to accomplices' confessions
that shift or spread blame can be effectively rebutted when.., the
government is involved in the statements' production, and when the
statements describe past events and have not been subjected to
adversarial testing." '338 This statement effectively describes the guilty
plea of an accomplice.339
The plurality would find an accomplice statement, influenced by the
government, to be presumptively unreliable.34 ° Justices Scalia and
Thomas would find that any prior testimony, admitted without
confrontation, is a clear violation of the Clause.34' Both views
arguably would find that the admission of an unavailable accomplice's
plea hearing testimony, subject as it is to government influence,342
violates the Confrontation Clause.
Plea allocutions, as a general rule, are admissible in the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits if the declarant faces a potentially long
sentence by making the plea allocution, regardless of the resulting
sentence. An accomplice's plea allocution, however, under most
conjunction with other evidence).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
334. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
335. Id. at 141; see Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 132 (1999); Lee v. Illinois, 476
U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
336. See supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
337. See supra Part I.C.
338. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 137.
339. See supra Part I.C; see also Rosenberg, supra note 83, at 541-42, 544-45 (2000)
(assuming that the holding in Lilly applies to guilty pleas as well as to confessions
made to government officials).
340. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
342. See supra Part III.A.l.c.
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circumstances, is given in the best interest of the declarant. The plea
hearing and later redaction do not add reliability to the allocution.
Therefore, the better view is that an unavailable accomplice's plea
allocution is generally a statement in the interest of the declarant and
its admission violates the Confrontation Clause.343
B. The Admission of Guilty Pleas Under 804(b) (3) Circumvents the
Intention of FRE 803(22) as a Matter of Statutory Interpretation
An accomplice's plea allocution also should be barred as
inconsistent with the intent of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
drafters sought to exclude guilty pleas of third persons to prove an
element of a crime against the accused.3" The admission of such
hearsay under the exception for statements against interest
circumvents the purpose of rule 803(22) and should be barred.345
Rule 803(22) states that "judgments against persons other than the
accused," including those resulting from guilty pleas, are not excepted
from the hearsay rule "when offered by the Government in a criminal
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment. '346 This rule was
premised on the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby v. United States.347
The intent of Rule 803(22) was to avoid conflict with the
confrontation right as expressed in Kirby.34' There, the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a statute that allowed admission of a
guilty plea, entered by the thief of property, against the recipient of
the property as conclusive evidence of the stolen nature of the
343. As Judge Weinstein concluded: "Because of the danger.., involved, exclusion
should almost always result when a statement against penal interest is offered against
an accused." Weinstein & Berger, supra note 106, at 804-70.
344. See infra notes 348-65 and accompanying text.
345. "We think it is significant that the Federal Rules of Evidence 'see no
inconsistency between Rule 804(b)(3) and Rule 803(22), which excepts from the
admissibility of judgments of conviction a 'judgment entered... upon a plea of
guilty ... when offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes
other than impeachment...."' Commonwealth v. Alicia, 378 N.E.2d 704, 706 (1978)
(alterations in original).
346. Fed. R. Evid. 803(22). The rule provides the following:
Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty
(but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove
any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by
the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than
impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The
pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not effect admissibility.
Id.
347. 174 U.S. 47 (1899); see supra note 63.
348. Fed. R. Evid. 803(22) advisory committee's note.. The availability of the
declarant is "immaterial" for this exception. Similarly, Chief Judge Seitz interpreted
the Kirby opinion to exclude the admission of guilty pleas as evidence of a conspiracy
even where the declarant was available for cross-examination. Bisaccia v. Attorney
General, 623 F.2d 307, 313-14 (3d'Cir. 1980) (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
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property.3 49 The Court noted that Kirby had not been present at the
proceedings against the declarants of the guilty pleas entered against
him. Even if he had been, he "would not have been permitted to
examine [declarants] upon their pleas of guilty,.. . nor introduce
witnesses to prove that they were not in fact guilty of the offense
charged against them. "350
In United States v. Oates31 - a Second Circuit decision involving the
explicit exclusion of hearsay by one rule, circumvented by the use of a
broad exception in another-the prosecution offered the report of an
unavailable government chemist to show that the defendant possessed
heroin,352 an element of the crime charged.3  The court found that
Rule 803(8) specifically barred the hearsay from use by the
prosecution, as the report was nothing more than "factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law. 3 54 The court found that the specific exclusion under Rule 803(8)
indicated a "clear legislative intent" that such hearsay was also to be
barred under Rule 803(6). 31' The court found such intent in the
Advisory Committee's noted desire to avoid impinging on the
confrontation right356 and on the fact that Congress added a further
protection to the Rule . 7  The court concluded that "Congress
intended ... the absolute inadmissibility of records of this nature. '358
The Fifth Circuit followed the reasoning of Oates in United States v.
Cain.359 Other circuits have come to the opposite conclusion for cases
in which the author of the report at issue testifies at trial.36 Courts
have found that, under those circumstances, there is no conflict with
Rule 803(8) because the confrontation of the author "protects against
the loss of an accused's confrontation rights, the underlying rationale
349. Kirby, 174 U.S. at 56.
350. Id. at 54. "In Kirby, the Court addressed a defendant's right to confront...
the witnesses that the government would have presented in a trial of the third
person." Bisaccia, 623 F.2d at 314 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
351. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
352. Id. at 64.
353. Id. at 53-56.
354. Id. at 67.
355. Id. at 68.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 69 (noting congressional amendment that added to Rule 803(8)(B) the
language "excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel").
358. Id.; see also United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1980) (following
reasoning of Oates); United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 355-56 (2d Cir. 1978)
(finding that an IRS computer printout was not admissible against defendant because
it detailed matters observed by law enforcement officials).
359. 615 F.2d at 382.
360. United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v.
Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 1988); see United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670,
673 (7th Cir. 1980).
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for Rule 803(8) and the basis of the court's concern in Oates.'' 361 As
the Seventh Circuit concluded, "[w]here the author does not testify,
congressional intent would be thwarted if the reports were admitted
under another hearsay exception. '362 When defendants have raised
the issue, circuit courts have construed the Rules to avoid
circumvention of congressional intent.363
With Rule 803(22), Congress clearly intended to completely exclude
the use of guilty pleas and allocutions as evidence of an element of a
crime . 4 The holding of Kirby, upon which the rule is based, is that
the elements of a crime against the defendant must be shown by live
testimony. "[A] fact which can be primarily established only by
witnesses cannot be proved ... except by witnesses who confront him
at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried. 3 65
Proper statutory interpretation precludes the use of another rule to
allow the plea allocution of an unavailable declarant to be used as
proof of an element of the crime with which the accused is charged.
The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits allow the prosecution to
show the element of conspiracy by hearsay.366 This view improperly
circumvents the intent of Rule 803(22).
CONCLUSION
The elements of shifting blame to the accused, government
involvement in its creation, and the incentive of a comparatively huge
discount in sentencing, belie any realistic vision of the accomplice's
guilty plea as a statement against interest. The presumptive
361. Hayes, 861 F.2d at 1230 (citation omitted); see also Sokolow, 91 F.3d at 405;
King, 613 F.2d at 673.
362. King, 613 F.2d at 673.
363. See, e.g., Sokolow, 91 F.3d at 405; Hayes, 861 F.2d at 1230; King, 613 F.2d at
673; cf United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1983) (declining to
extend limitations of Rule 803(8)(C) to Rule 803(10) because statement at issue did
not directly address the actions of defendant, but instead addressed the absence of the
records of an agency, had no "evaluative" aspects, and was not among the kinds of
reports intended by Congress for exclusion under Rule 803(8)); United States v. Neff,
615 F.2d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that 803(10) admissions--statements as to
the absence of public records--were inherently trustworthy and lacked the evaluative
nature of reports at issue in Oates); United States v. Stone, 604 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir.
1979) (finding Rule 803(8) was "designed to allow admission of official records and
reports prepared by an agency or government office for purposes independent of
specific litigation"). But cf United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1986)
(upholding admission of DEA report against criminal defendants under Rule 803(5)
(past recollection recorded) based on pre-Oates First Circuit precedent); United
States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1201 (6th Cir. 1985) (declining to read Rule
803(8)(C) limitations into Rule 803(10) (absence of public record or entry), because
"Congress could have included the restriction found in Rule 803(8)(C) in Rule
803(10)").
364. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
365. United States v. Kirby, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
366. United States v. Centracchio, 265 F.3d. 518 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 269 (2d. Cir. 2000).
260 [Vol. 71
2002] GUILTY PLEAS 261
unreliability of an accomplice's incrimination is inherent in the
incriminatory allocution of an accomplice, and such statements fail
under the Confrontation Clause. Alternatively, the admission of
guilty pleas circumvents the legislative intent of the Rules as
expressed in Rule 803(22), and must be barred.
Notes & Observations
